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SEPARATIONS OF WEALTH: INEQUALITY AND THE EROSION OF
CHECKS AND BALANCES
***

Kate Andrias
ABSTRACT

American government is dysfunctional: Gridlock, filibusters, and expanding presidential power,
everyone seems to agree, threaten our basic system of constitutional governance. Who, or what, is
to blame? In the standard account, the fault lies with the increasing polarization of our political
parties. That standard story, however, ignores an important culprit: Concentrated wealth and its
organization to achieve political ends. The only way to understand our current constitutional
predicament—and to rectify it—is to pay more attention to the role that organized wealth plays in
our system of checks and balances.
This Article shows that the increasing concentration of wealth and political power in the hands of
the wealthy elite, and the concomitant decline of countervailing organizations, help explain the
extent of executive power, the rise of gridlock, and, ultimately, the deterioration of effective checks
and balances in the Federal Government. A core goal of constitutional structure—to promote
democratic accountability and responsiveness to the broad citizenry—is severely compromised by the
power wielded by organized wealth. Moderating partisanship will not alone solve constitutional
dysfunction, nor will conventional good governance reforms like campaign finance regulation.
Rather, this Article argues, the law should facilitate organizations of ordinary Americans that can
serve as a countervailing check and prod in governance.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Everyone seems to agree: American government is dysfunctional.
Politicians are continuously at each other’s throats. Congress is paralyzed. Budgets are not enacted; legislation is not passed. Americans’
faith in government suffers.
What is to blame? According to the standard narrative the problem is political polarization. Hyperpolarized political parties mean
that, during unified government, the legislative and executive
branches collude and the executive operates with few constraints.
1

THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM, at
xii–xiv (2012); see also David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2,
9 (2014) (describing the “gridlocked, agonistic ‘Age of Dysfunction’ that we now inhabit”); Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 479, 480 (2012)
(collecting sources).
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During divided government, gridlock ensues. The President and the
administrative state fill the vacuum, energetically wielding executive
3
power to partisan ends. To solve our problems, commentators assert, we must moderate partisanship.
There is a lot of truth to this standard account. But it is not the
whole story. If we want to understand our current predicament—and
if we hope to have any chance of pulling ourselves out of it—we need
to focus not only on partisanship but also on the problem of concentrated wealth and its organization to achieve political ends.
After a period of shared prosperity following the New Deal and
World War II, the United States has, over the last generation, experienced a dramatic rise in economic inequality. Disparities in income
4
and wealth are at levels not seen since the Gilded Age. Rising inequality has been accompanied by the concentration, or reconcentration, of political power among wealthy individuals, large
business firms, and organized groups representing them, as well as by
a precipitous decline of countervailing organization among middle5
and low-income Americans. Organized wealth has overtaken other
civic and social organizations as the key driving force in American
politics.
Recent scholarly assessment of money in governance has focused
6
on whether it encourages corruption and capture. But what the literature has almost entirely overlooked is how wealth affects constitutional structure, particularly the separation of powers and the opera-

2

3
4
5

6

Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in
America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 333 (2011) (arguing that the consequences of “radically polarized parties” are “unified government without meaningful checks and balances, and
divided government that is paralyzed”).
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 120
(2010).
See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 347–50 (Arthur Goldwater trans., 2014); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY, at xxxiv (2013).
See, e.g., LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS
BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 9–15, 71 (2015); THEDA
SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN
CIVIC LIFE 128–74 (2003); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 576–77 (2014);
see also, Nicholas Confessore et al., Small Pool of Rich Donors Dominates Election Giving, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/us/small-pool-of-richdonors-dominates-election-giving.html (“Fewer than four hundred families are responsible for almost half the money raised in the 2016 presidential campaign, a concentration
of political donors that is unprecedented in the modern era.”).
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT 5 (2011); ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014). See also infra notes 150–62, 356.

422

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:2

7

tion of checks and balances. Not in the formal sense of these terms,
but in the functional sense: The dominance of organized wealth
matters for how power is, or is not, diffused and checked throughout
our government; for how ambition does, or does not, counter ambition; and ultimately for the extent of government’s democratic responsiveness to the citizenry as a whole, rather than to a particular
faction.
Through a range of strategies—from campaign donations, lobbying, and regulatory comment, to the provision of expertise to government officials and the threat of litigation—wealthy individuals,
large business firms, and their organizations dominate every step of
the political process. The empirical evidence from the social sciences
8
is substantial. Wealth influences not only Congress and the President, but also the mechanisms scholars argue have replaced
Madisonian checks and balances—i.e., political parties and internal
executive branch checks.
That is, constitutional law scholars contend that the formal
Madisonian schema of separated powers is, to a great extent, anachronistic. The branches qua branches do not have fixed identities or
interests that compete. Instead, political competition is channeled in
9
large part through the political parties. Administrative law scholars
agree, though they point to mechanisms within the executive branch
that provide an additional or alternative system of checks and balanc-

7

8
9

For recent efforts to return questions of economic inequality to constitutional theory, see
generally Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 669 (2014); Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2016). For earlier treatment, see, for example, CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 73 (1935) (discussing the
economic interests of the Framers of the Constitution); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
See infra Part II.
The leading account is Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2317–19 (2006). See also MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 8–32 (2003) (describing the influence of political parties in the
new constitutional order); Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1809 n.222 (2007) (agreeing with the assertions
of Levinson & Pildes regarding the need for constitutional theory to recognize the centrality of political parties); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 633, 644–52 (2000) (noting the influence of politics on controlling key institutions
in the American system); cf. Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary
Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 617, 625, 640 (2010) (examining how separation of powers affects voters’ electoral
strategies).
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es. Under this vision of “internal” or “administrative” separation of
powers, a multilayered bureaucracy allays fears about the expanded
executive, curbs excesses of power even during unified partisan government, and enables continued innovation during divided govern11
ment.
The “separation of parties” and the “internal” separation of powers accounts do much to ground constitutional theory in practical realities. But they proceed largely without regard to problems of economic and political inequality. This omission stands in contrast to an
earlier tradition in constitutional theory. For earlier writers, constitutional structure was not just about the formal separation of powers
but also about “the accountability and dispersal of power, broadly
12
construed.”
In our current political moment, questions about the relationship
between constitutional structure and the distribution of political and
economic power are again urgent. Today, those wielding significant
13
wealth serve almost as a fifth branch of government. They check
and prod the branches, the parties, and the bureaucracy. Because of
the weakness of organizations representing ordinary Americans, few
countervailing checks exist. The result is that power in government is

10

11

12

13

See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 603, 605–06 (2001) (arguing that rather than powers being split between
branches, “government authority is diffused among a large and diverse set of government
decisionmakers who have a hand in the exercise of state power”); Gillian E. Metzger, The
Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J.
423, 457 (2009) (emphasizing the role of internal executive branch constraints); Jon D.
Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 532, 536–37
(2015) (discussing the evolution of the balance of power from branches to an administrative theory and beyond).
See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1562 (2007) (emphasizing the role of “legal advisors
within the executive branch” as a constraint on executive power); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J.
2314, 2317–19 (2006) (describing beauracracy as “a critical mechanism to promote internal separation of powers”).
William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism, and the Liberal State: The Historical Sociology of James
Willard Hurst, 18 L. AND HIST. REV. 97, 132 (2000) (discussing the work of James Willard
Hurst, the founding father of American legal history); see also infra note 89.
The claim is that organized wealth is a fifth branch much in the same way that the media
constitutes a fourth estate, see THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP AND THE
HEROIC IN HISTORY 152 (1840), or the administrate state constitute the fourth branch.
See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (declaring that administrative agencies had “become a veritable fourth branch of the Government”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 passim (1984) (describing agencies as a fourth
branch).
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both more and less concentrated than the traditional partisanfocused narrative suggests.
Consider, for example, the recent experience with healthcare reform. The standard account posits the exercise of unconstrained executive power in times of unified government. Yet despite a supermajority of Democrats in Congress, the Democratic President was
clearly checked. From the outset, it was evident that the President
could hold his party in Congress only with the support of industry—
the drug industry, the hospital industry, and the insurance industry,
among others. The statute that emerged from Congress in 2010,
while politically polarizing to this day, represented neither an unbound exercise of partisan power nor an ideological pole of public
14
policy opinion.
Or consider the minimum wage. The standard account is that
partisanship explains gridlock on this issue. But substantial bipartisan
15
support for an increase in the minimum wage exists among voters.
The failure of Congress to amend the minimum wage is best explained not by the divide in perspective between Republicans and
Democrats, but by the success of organized business interests in en16
suring the opposition of key legislators. Conversely, when Congress
recently voted to repeal a restriction on big banks imposed after the
2008 financial crisis, it did so because organized business marshalled
bipartisan support. Notably, those Democrats who voted in favor of
17
repeal had received the most money from the financial industry.
As these examples show, partisanship is an incomplete explanation for government’s function. The concentration of economic and
political power in the hands of the wealthy elite is also a critical factor. To be sure, wealthy interests do not always prevail in politics.
Their influence is diminished in high-salience areas and when coun-

14
15

16

17

See infra notes 236–42 and accompanying text.
Marianne Levine & Timothy Noah, Minimum Wage Hikes Win, POLITICO (Nov. 5, 2014,
1:57 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/minimum-wage-increase-wins-in-fourred-states-112565; Constantine Von Hoffman, Support for Raising Minimum Wage Found in
Surprising Places, CBS MONEY WATCH (Jan. 28, 2014, 2:32 PM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/support-for-minimum-wage-increase-found-in-surprising-places/.
See Von Hoffman, supra note 15 (“A December Washington Post poll found two-thirds of
Americans support raising the minimum wage, while a recent Gallup poll showed 76 percent in favor.”).
Philip Bump, Democrats Who Voted for the CRomnibus Have Received Twice as Much Money From
the Finance Industry as the “No” Voters, WASH. POST (Dec. 12 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/12/12/democrats-who-voted-for-thespending-bill-have-received-twice-as-much-money-from-the-finance-industry-as-the-novoters/.
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tervailing organizations are present and strong. There are many
values and interests other than wealth that play an important role in
policy debates. And wealth is not monolithic. Competing views exist
among economic elites and organized business interests, as do differences in the mechanisms of participation used by the wealthiest individuals, on the one hand, and business firms and their organizations,
19
on the other. But together, wealthy individuals and organizations
overwhelmingly influence elected officials, the internal bureaucracy,
20
and the political parties in a wide range of arenas.
This systematic influence forces us to reconsider key pillars of the
prevailing descriptive account of contemporary executive and legislative power. First, governmental power is systematically more constrained during periods of unified, partisan government than the
dominant accounts imply, at least on certain issues. Wealth participates disproportionately at every stage of the democratic process and
is well positioned to exploit the system’s multiple veto points, providing a strong constraint even during periods of one-party control, and
even when a majority of the public supports action. Recent experiences with healthcare, finance, and labor law reform under unified
21
Democratic government illustrate the point.
Second, during periods of divided government, gridlock dominates, but it is not the neutral, cross-substantive phenomenon the
dominant theory suggests, nor can it be explained by partisanship
alone. Rather, wealth interests affect inaction disproportionately and
benefit from it uniquely. This is particularly true of organizations
18
19

20

21

See, e.g., infra notes 142, 158–59, 280–82 and accompanying text.
For discussion of who comprises the category of “wealth” or “wealthy interests” and the
different ways in which this group engages the political process, see infra notes 81–87 and
accompanying text.
While this Article’s focus is with the Federal Government, many of its arguments apply
with equal force to state governments. In particular, the problem of organized wealth’s
influence over state judiciaries is particularly acute. See, e.g., BILLY CORRIHER, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS, KOCH BROTHERS AND D.C. CONSERVATIVES SPENDING BIG ON NONPARTISAN
STATE SUPREME COURT RACES 1–6 (2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/StateSupremeCourtsv2.pdf (describing funding of judicial
candidates by the Koch brothers and other wealthy donors in order to advance an agenda
that includes opposition to redistributive taxes and unions); William Kistner, Justice for
Sale?,
AMERICAN
RADIOWORKS,
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/
features/judges/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) (noting the increasing level of financial contribution to state court elections and the subsequent erosion of judicial independence);
Christie Thompson, Trial by Cash, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 11, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/trial-by-cash/383631/ (discussing
the devolution of judicial races from “largely polite, low-budget affairs” to big-budget,
“political circus[es]” in which large campaign donors back judicial candidates in the
hopes of garnering votes on the bench).
See infra notes 227–55 and accompanying text.
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representing business. As noted, business interests have been able to
block changes to labor and employment laws, such as a raise in the
minimum wage, even when such changes are overwhelmingly supported in polls. At the same time, during this gridlock, wealthy interests have achieved changes to the status quo through private ordering—such as by increasingly relying on independent contractors who
22
fall beyond the reach of much employment law.
Third, because internal executive branch mechanisms are so often
dominated by wealth, they are worse at diffusing power and enabling
innovation than their proponents assert. The experience of financial
regulatory reform in the aftermath of Dodd-Frank provides just one
23
example of this phenomenon. In short, wealth both augments and
retards the various dynamics of functional checks and balances, and
prods and pleas, in ways that are systematic and comprehensive, but
24
not adequately considered by the standard accounts.
Some might contend that the systematic influence of wealth is a
boon for the separation of powers’ functional aspirations because it
moderates and limits government action even in times of unified
government. I reject that view. Organized wealth has corrosive effects upon constitutional structure’s functional goals—namely, to diffuse political power and ensure ambition counters ambition, in order
to promote liberty, governmental efficacy, and democratic accounta25
bility. In particular, wealth’s dominance undermines the promise
that our system of political checks will produce a government roughly
26
responsive to the majority will.

22
23
24

25

26

See infra notes 270–73 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 284–91 and accompanying text.
On the importance of “prods and pleas” as well as “checks and balances” in our system of
constitutional governance, see Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 366–67 (2011).
Though this Article engages debates about constitutional aims, it is agnostic on the question of the Founders’ original intent. Instead, it adopts the dominant perspective of contemporary constitutional and administrative law theory regarding the functional goals of
the separation of powers. See infra notes 58–69, 298–99 and accompanying text.
Of course, no government is perfectly responsive to its citizenry and perfect responsiveness may not even be an aspiration of our constitutional system. See generally Adrian
Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123
HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2009). Still, there is general agreement among theorists that citizens
in a democracy ought have equal opportunity to influence the political process, and that
government ought to be responsive to their views. See, e.g., HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 144–45 (1967); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 327
(1993). This Article takes that premise as a given, without trying to articulate an optimal
distribution of political power. For a similar approach, see Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L. J. 148, 158 (2013) (“In theory
and in doctrine, we can often identify what is troublingly unfair, unequal, or wrong with-
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Where do we go from here? Various possibilities exist to reform
the law in response to organized wealth’s negative effects on the dif27
fusion of power and democratic accountability. Much scholarly attention has been focused on reforming voting and campaign finance
laws in order to make individual political participation more equal;
scholars have also urged making government both more transparent
28
and more insulated from political pressures.
Others advocate
heightened judicial scrutiny of laws that harm the poor or benefit or29
ganized wealthy interests. While these proposals are important, the
analysis of this Article suggests that their promise has been oversold.
Additional, less familiar proposals aimed at involving organizations of
30
citizens in governance and politics are necessary complements.
Consistent with the Madisonian aspiration, reforms aimed at facilitating countervailing organization could help check and balance concentrated power, ensure that ambition counters ambition, and re31
duce the dominance of one faction.
A final note at the outset: Much of the contemporary literature
on capture and corruption refers generally to the problem of “inter32
est groups” and “special interests.” This Article refuses that framing
for two reasons. First, the discussion often implicitly or explicitly as-

27

28
29
30
31
32

out a precise standard of what is optimally fair, equal, or right.” (quoting Richard H.
Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1612 (1999))).
One way to redress the problem of organized wealth in politics and governance is, of
course, to enact laws that redistribute wealth through, for example, taxes and transfers,
mandates for higher wages, and limits on executive pay. For a sampling of some such
proposals, see generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003); Brishen Rogers, Justice
at Work: Minimum Wage Laws & Social Equality, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1543 (2014). Such proposals are critically important but beyond this paper’s focus on the constitutional governance.
See infra Part IV.C (evaluting existing reform proposals).
See infra Part III.B (evaluating the possibility of heightened judicial scrutiny and noting
the influence of wealth on the judiciary).
On the role of countervailing power, see generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN
CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (rev. ed. 1956).
See infra Part IV.C. For these purposes, I accept as a given the basic separation-of-powers
system. Accord Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2348.
See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1390 (2013) (defining agency capture as “organized groups
successfully acting to vindicate their interests through government policy at the expense
of the public interest”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 29, 30–31 (1985) (arguing for greater judicial review to weaken the role of “interest groups” and to further republicanism). For a historical perspective on how political
economy fell out of discussions about pluralism, see Ira Katznelson, A Lost Opportunity?, in
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER 185, at 192, 204 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle
eds., 1989).
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sumes that participation of organized groups in politics and governance is bad, in part because such participation leads to the incapacity
of governmental institutions to serve the public interest. This Article
rejects the proposition that participation in government, including
33
through organizations, should be discouraged. Second, and more
importantly, referring to “interest groups” or “special interests” generically obfuscates the distribution of group power. On economic
issues, that power is heavily weighted toward business interests and
agglomerations of private wealth, and away from the vast majority of
Americans. It is this unequal distribution of power that is at the heart
of the problems explored in this Article—not the fact of organized
participation in democracy.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains why the separation of powers is a useful frame for examining the problem of wealth
in governance, even though wealth does not typically function to aggrandize the power of one branch over another.
Part II then uses several strands of social science research, often
treated independently from one another, to show that wealth systematically influences existing mechanisms of checks and balances—the
34
branches, the political parties, and the bureaucracy.
Part III revises the prevailing descriptive account of contemporary
executive and legislative power. First, it explores how state power is
systematically more constrained during periods of unified government than predicted by theorists who focus on partisanship. Second,
during periods of divided government, gridlock dominates, but it is
not the neutral, cross-substantive phenomenon the dominant accounts suggest. Third, internal executive branch checks often underdeliver on their promise.
Part IV evaluates the influence of wealth against the functional
goals of the separation of powers as understood by contemporary
scholars. It argues that organized wealth’s effects are deleterious,
particularly for democratic accountability. It then considers how the

33

34

For an intellectual history of capture theory, exploring how center-left critiques of the
pervasive influence of industry in particular agencies morphed into a neoliberal argument against the general governmental regulatory impulse as a whole, see generally William J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 25 (Daniel Carpenter &
David A. Moss eds., 2014). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts:
1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1055 (1997) (identifying a shift in attitudes toward
the administrative state, during the period 1946–1997, from rationalism to populism to
libertarianism).
The judiciary is considered in Part IV.B.
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law might be reformed in response, arguing for the need to facilitate
countervailing organizations.
I. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SEPARATING, CHECKING, AND

BALANCING POWER
Public law has long grappled with the fact that certain groups in
society have disproportionate power in the democratic political pro35
cess. Civil rights scholars address the political and social dominance
of whites over blacks, or men over women. Administrative law theorists tackle industry’s capture of the regulatory process. Election law
scholars worry about the role of wealthy donors and the disenfranchisement of minority voters; they aim to equalize access to the political process, while preventing political corruption.
But the separation of powers has not been a frame for grappling
with disproportionate political power. The assumption is that there is
no connection between intra-branch interaction in government and
the dominance of a particular group in society. This is true to a
point. The disproportionate influence of the wealthy (or any other
group) would be a problem even if there were only one branch of
government. And while wealth consistently checks and prods the
branches, it does not necessarily contribute to the aggrandizement of
one branch at the expense of another. Rather, wealth operates across
the branches. Moreover, it is not at all clear that James Madison or
the other Framers intended the system of separated powers to be redistributive in operation, or that they worried about the dispropor36
tionate power of economic elites in particular.

35
36

For suggestions regarding the following points, I am grateful to Daryl Levinson.
Some scholars have argued that our system of separated powers and checks and balances,
with its multiple veto points and lack of a truly popular lower house, was hard-wired to
produce government by the wealthy and propertied classes. BEARD, supra note 7, at 165–
68, 324; JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 149, 218 (1990).
Others counter that although the Founders were concerned about popular tyranny, and
advocated checks and balances as one way to limit the masses’ power, they were also fundamentally committed to a republican government dependent on the will of the people.
COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE SPIRIT OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 84–
85 (2009). Indeed, theorists have argued that relative equality among the citizenry (albeit an overly narrow citizenry of white men) was a precondition for the constitutional vision. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 25 (1965) (arguing that “revolution as we know
it in the modern age has always been concerned with both liberation and freedom,” and
emphasizing equality, among existing citizenry, as a precondition for American constitutionalism).
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Why, then, should we think about wealth’s dominance through a
structural constitutional lens? For two reasons—and with two important payoffs.
First, bringing wealth’s role squarely into structural constitutional
theory provides a necessary corrective to the dominant explanations
37
for constitutional dysfunction. According to commentators across
the spectrum, political polarization in Washington has reached crisis
38
levels. Because of conditions of relatively high interparty polarization and intraparty political fragmentation, Congress is paralyzed in
times of divided government; and in periods of unified government,
39
we see legislation that is ideologically ambitious and extreme. Poli40
cy-making is now blood sport, and rabid partisanship makes political
leaders less likely to compromise and less likely to govern wisely in
41
ways responsive to public will. Americans express deep dissatisfac42
tion with their elected officials.
Hyper-partisanship, legal scholars emphasize, is not just a political
43
problem, it is also a constitutional problem. As Daryl Levinson and
Richard Pildes wrote nearly ten years ago, a system intended to channel competition through the political branches actually channels it
through the political parties; in their words, our government is char-

37
38

39

40

41

42

43

See infra Part III (discussing existing structural constitutional law literature’s relative silence on subject of wealth in governance and how that results in key descriptive era).
See, e.g., Josh Kraushaar, The Most Divided Congress Ever, At Least Until Next Year, NAT’L J.
(Feb. 6 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/2013-vote-ratings/the-most-dividedcongress-ever-at-least-until-next-year-20140206 (noting that the 2013 congress was the
most polarized since polarization has been calculated); see also supra note 1.
See Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of
American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 808–10 (2014) (arguing that fragmentation of political parties undermines leadership and compromise); Pildes, supra note 2, at 333 (arguing that the consequences of “radically polarized parties” are “unified government without meaningful checks and balances, and divided government that is paralyzed”).
Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law As Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in A Highly Partisan
Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1679–81 (2012) (identifying partisanship as explanation for
“blood sport” policy battles).
Pildes, supra note 2, at 330–31; Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 12–18
(2015); Patricia Wald & Neil Kinkopf, Putting Separation of Powers into Practice: Reflections
on Senator Schumer’s Essay, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 41, 52 (2007) (“On balance, we find
substantial agreement even among these skeptics that things have gotten more polarized
and less conducive to good legislating in recent years and that political party domination
of Congress is a root cause.”).
See, e.g., Jeff Zeleny & Megan Thee-Brenan, New Poll Finds a Deep Distrust of Government,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, at A1 (“Not only do 89 percent of Americans say they distrust
government to do the right thing, but 74 percent say the country is on the wrong track
and 84 percent disapprove of Congress—warnings for Democrats and Republicans
alike.”).
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2313.
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acterized by the “separation of parties, not powers.” And because of
hyper-polarization, the system breaks down. According to some
commentators, the executive branch during unified government is
dangerously unchecked; during divided government, it inappropriately pushes the bounds of formal authority to advance a political
45
agenda. Other scholars are more sanguine: They acknowledge the
role of partisanship but point to mechanisms within the executive
branch that curb excesses of power, while enabling continued inno46
vation.
The partisanship diagnosis for the affliction of constitutional dysfunction is pervasive—and has had profound impact on legal scholar47
ship. It has served as the basis for a host of descriptive arguments
48
49
regarding administrative law, separation of powers, and federal44
45
46
47

48

49

Id.
See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
On the influence of the partisanship theory, see Ackerman, supra note 9, at 1810 n.222
(describing the parties-not-powers theory as a “breakthrough” and an “essential reference
point”); Richard A. Epstein, Why Parties and Powers Both Matter: A Separationist Response to
Levinson and Pildes, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 210 (2006) (describing the Levinson-Pildes
theory as “provocative and instructive”); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87
TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1512 (2009) (describing as “relatively widespread,” the “understanding
that the working U.S. Constitution depends heavily on the operation of the political party
system”).
David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267,
306 (2013) (noting that hyper-partisanship and divided government have contributed to
a new form of congressional delegation of broad lawmaking power to administrative
agencies, which has come to define the modern regulatory state); Neal Devins & David E.
Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88
B.U. L. REV. 459, 479, 498 (2008) (noting that “the separation of powers between Congress and the White House has given way to the ‘separation of parties’” and using that
theory to understand the operation of independent agencies); Jody Freeman & David B.
Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV 1, 1–5 (2014) (arguing that because
of the influence of partisanship on inter-branch relations, Congress is increasingly absent
from the policymaking process, and fails to regularly update statutes in the face of social,
economic, and technological change; this leaves agencies to adapt old statutes to new
problems); McGarity, supra note 40, at 1762 (identifying partisanship as the explanation
for policy failure in the regulatory state).
See, e.g., David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE. L.J. 548, 602–03 (2009) (explaining that the vision of branch loyalty upon which the American originalist vision of a
separation of powers is based has collapsed and arguing for government in opposition
rules to better constrain unified government); Katyal, supra note 11, at 2321 (“This expansion of presidential power is reinforced by the party system. When the political
branches are controlled by the same party, loyalty, discipline, and self-interest generally
preclude interbranch checking.”); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential
Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 519 (2008) (“The problem, of course, is that separation of parties serves as no balance at all when both the Presidency and the Congress are controlled by the same party. In those circumstances, the
power of the Presidency is effectively unchecked.”).
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50

ism. For example, scholars invoke polarization to explain the rise of
51
executive power, including recent innovations of the administrative
52
53
state, and to analyze the impotence of Congress. They also point
to partisanship when exploring the relevance of historical acquies54
cence between the branches, and the nature of contestation, or the
55
lack thereof, on the state-federal dimension. Concerns about partisanship motivate numerous reform proposals: Legal scholars have
explored how partisanship might be moderated and how internal executive branch innovations can mediate government dysfunction resulting from hyper-polarization, either by providing a check on the
partisan executive from within or by enabling policy innovation in an
56
era of gridlock.
The conclusion that partisanship is a driving force in government,
causing both legislative gridlock and instances of executive overreach, is unassailable. A look at recent headlines coming out of
Washington proves the point. Yet the preoccupation with partisanship has obscured another important force in contemporary constitutional governance—wealth.
Wealth and partisanship are not unrelated. Indeed, rising inequality, political scientists argue, is one important cause of hyper57
polarization. At the same time, as Parts II and III show, wealth’s influence cuts across partisan divides, narrowing the divergence between party elites on key issues; it also affects the internal executive
branch mechanisms scholars celebrate as a check on partisanship. In
50

51
52

53

54

55
56
57

See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2014) (positing that partisanship, rather than something essential to our federal structure, explains
why states check the Federal Government and whether Americans identify with the states
as well as the nation).
See Marshall, supra note 49, at 518–19 (“[I]n an era of highly polarized parties, there no
longer exists the constitutional balance purportedly fostered by separation of powers.”).
See Freeman & Spence, supra note 48, at 79–81 (describing the recent efforts of administrative agencies to revitalize old statutes to accomplish new policy objectives in the wake
of congressional inaction).
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2311 (2001) (“[T]he
possibility of significant legislative accomplishment . . . has grown dim in an era of divided government with high polarization . . . .”); cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2344
(asserting that electoral accountability is least effective “when party control of government is divided”).
See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411, 413–15 (2012) (positing that arguments about historical acquiescence
often rest on assumptions about congressional-executive relations that do not reflect actual institutional behavior, in part because of partisanship); Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 377, 412–17 (2011).
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 50, at 1078.
See supra note 11; see also infra note 350.
See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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short, we cannot understand how contemporary mechanisms of political competition function without examining wealth’s effect on them.
And only by viewing the dynamics of wealth in governance holistically, rather than as isolated problems of campaign money and agency
capture, as the legal literature tends to do, does a more complete picture of constitutional function and dysfunction emerge.
The second reason why the separation of powers is a useful frame
is that the problem of wealth’s dominance in governance is analogous in important respects to the problems Madison and the other
Framers hoped to tackle when constituting the government. The first
three Articles of the United States Constitution are designed to create
a framework for democratic governance. They aim to guard against
two broad classes of political pathology, both involving the domi58
nance of one group over another.
First, the Framers were concerned about protecting citizens who might be tyrannized by despotic
59
and corrupt federal officials. “In framing a government which is to
be administered by men over men,” Madison wrote in Federalist No.
51, “the great difficulty lies in” obliging the government “to control
60
itself.” Second, the Framers worried about factions of the electorate
61
seeking to capture government for their own selfish ends. Thus,
Federalist No. 51 continues, “[i]t is of great importance in a republic
not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but
to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other
62
part.”
Madison understood the dangers of faction to inhere in both the
majority and the minority, but he was far more worried about the tyr63
anny of the majority. He failed to predict, or perhaps did not fear,
64
the extent to which a small elite would come to dominate.
58

59
60
61

62
63

64

Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment,
124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 666 (2011) [hereinafter Parchment and Politics]; Daryl J. Levinson,
Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1293 (2012).
Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 58, at 666.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 58, at 666 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10,
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION at xii–xiii
(1998)).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 60, at 322.
Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 60, at 78 (James Madison) (“By a faction I
understand a number of citizens whether amounting to a majority or minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.”), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 60, at 323 (“If a majority be united
by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”). See also Levinson,
Rights and Votes, supra note 58, at 1294.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, the overarching concern of Madison and the other
Framers was with a government in service of a particular faction, rather than the general good; their object was to prevent a government
that put the interests of the minority or the majority above “the rights
of other citizens” and “the permanent and aggregate interests of the
65
community.”
Rather than attempting to enumerate the rights of the majority
and minority and protect them directly, as the Bill of Rights, the Reconstruction Amendments, and much contemporary public law tries
to do, Madison and the other Framers hoped the structure of government would guard against corrupt officials and powerful factions
66
indirectly. They sought to shift power to the national government
in the hope that more factions would be brought into competition
with one another, thereby making it more difficult for one faction to
67
capture the government. They created branches and levels of government, in the hope that the different branches would compete with
68
one another, creating a self-enforcing check on national officials. In
short, they hoped to create a government in which “[a]mbition”
69
would “counteract ambition.”
This system of “checks and balances” and “separated powers” has
analogues in other constitutional systems, present and historical.
Consider, for example the theory of mixed government. That tradition, with its ancient pedigree, is based on the belief “that the major
interests in society must be allowed to take part jointly in the functions of government, so preventing any one interest from being able
70
to impose its will upon the others.” For the British contemporaries
(and predecessors) of the Framers, mixed government was about balancing the rights of the King, the Lords, and the Commons, and pre71
venting any one class from dominating the others. For the Framers,
72
But the approach incorporated
economic class was less central.

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 60, at 78.
See Levinson, Rights and Votes, supra note 58, at 1295 (discussing Framers’ structural approach).
Id.
Id. at 1296.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 60, at 322.
M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 37 (2d ed. 1998).
Id. at 74–82, 117–23.
Historians have argued, however, that class played a role in the Madisonian approach. As
M.J.C. Vile writes, the separation of powers “assumes that the legislature will, or may, be
taken over entirely by the democratic element, and that checks upon ‘mob rule’ will
therefore have to be applied by branches of the government largely or wholly outside the
legislature.” Id. at 37. See also supra note 36.
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73

many of mixed government’s concepts. The premise remained that
allocating political decisionmaking power would be a more reliable
way to guard against the problems of factional dominance than express prohibitions on, or guarantees of, particular political out74
comes.
The theory and practice of “consociational democracy” provides
75
another analogy.
That model “institutionalizes power-sharing
among [groups in society] through arrangements like grand coalition
cabinets, proportional representation in the legislatures, and mutual
76
veto rights.” Other societies have adopted different structural ap77
proaches to balance power in the face of deep social divides. At the
sub constitutional level, a parallel can be found in the practice of
“corporatism”—the system of institutionalizing representation of social groups, such as unions, business associations, and professional
groups, into decisionmaking boards to which significant authority is
78
delegated by government. But all of these systems share the basic
approach of avoiding the dominance of one group over others
79
through organizational and structural mechanisms.
By viewing the problem of wealth in governance through the lens
of structure and power sharing, an array of reform options that are
often missing from the rights-centric approach predominant in
80
American public law comes into focus.

73

74

75

76
77
78

79
80

For two accounts of the theory of mixed government and its relationship to separation of
powers, see W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN OF THE
DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
(1965); VILE, supra note 70.
See Levinson, Rights and Votes, supra note 58, at 1293–1300 (discussing, in addition to the
Madisonian approach, John C. Calhoun’s proposal for a dual executive comprising a
Northern and Southern President, as well as suggestions for balancing the Supreme
Court between Justices from slaveholding and non-slaveholding states).
Id. at 1307–11. The leading theorist is Arend Lijphart. See generally AREND LIJPHART,
DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977) (arguing that a
system of consociational democracy can help produce stability in plural societies); Arend
Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 21 WORLD POL. 207 (1969) (explaining the concept of
consociational democracy).
Levinson, Rights and Votes, supra note 58, at 1307–08.
Id. at 1308–10.
See Peter A. Gourevitch, The Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation, 112 YALE L.J. 1829,
1869 (2003) (reviewing MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003)) (defining corporatism).
Levinson, Rights and Votes, supra note 58, at 1307–08.
See Part IV.C. Such reforms do not require abandonment of our basic constitutional
structure, but rather can be adopted within the existing regime as complements to traditional reform strategies.
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II. THE POWER OF ORGANIZED WEALTH
Before proceeding, it is important to define the category “wealth”
or “wealthy interests”—and to acknowledge the challenge of doing
so. I use the term to refer to wealthy individuals—those who comprise the top 1% and .01% of income earners and wealth holders and
those in the top socieoeconomic status (“SES”) quintile—as well as to
large business organizations, particularly corporations and their trade
associations. There is considerable overlap among and between these
two groups. The country’s wealthiest individuals are, for the most
part, the leaders, owners, and directors of the wealthiest business or81
ganizations.
But there are also important differences between economic elites
and wealthy business organizations. For one, individuals and organizations tend to participate in the governance process in different
ways. Organizations focus more energy on lobbying and on the regulatory process, while wealthy individuals tend to concentrate more on
82
campaign contributions. Individuals tend to be more partisan and
ideological in their giving patterns, while businesses tend to donate to
83
both political parties strategically.
Meanwhile, among wealthy individuals and business organizations, there are competing views and preferences. For example,
when acting individually, economic elites tend to prefer lower government spending across the board, but when operating within a particular business organization, they tend to favor more spending on
84
that particular industry’s subsidies. Moreover, business groups and
wealthy individuals are not always in agreement with one another.
85
Sometimes there is vigorous lobbying on multiple sides of an issue.
81

82

83
84
85

See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore et al., Small Pool of Rich Donors Dominates Election Giving, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/us/small-pool-of-richdonors-dominates-election-giving.html (“Fewer than four hundred familes are responsible for almost half the money raised in the 2016 presidential campaign . . . .”); MillionDollar Donors in the 2016 Presidential Race, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2016/us/elections/top-presidential-donors-campaign-money.html (last updated Aug. 25, 2015) (identifying donors who have contributed more than a million dollars to the 2016 presidential campaigns and listing their occupations).
See Edward T. Walker & Christopher M. Rea, The Mobilization of Firms and Industries, 40
ANN. REV. SOC. 281, 286 (2014) (noting that “[t]he largest share of PAC money comes
from individuals” and that “corporate PAC spending is only a fraction of what firms tend
to spend on lobbying”).
Gilens & Page, supra note 5, at 571; see also infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
Gilens & Page, supra note 5, at 571.
See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, Behind Closed Doors, Ford, UPS, and Visa Push for Net Neutrality,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-1114/net-neutrality-ford-ups-visa-and-bofa-lobby-fcc-in-secret (describing how Internet ser-
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Yet recent studies suggest that divergence of opinion on economic
issues among wealthy individuals is less common than one might ex86
pect. And while business groups diverge on discrete issues, e.g., to
lobby for their own industry’s interest, they, like wealthy individuals,
are generally unified on broad principles of economic policy, includ87
ing tax policy, labor policy, and deregulation. In short, as the following sections will elaborate, the category of wealth, while not homogenous, is coherent. And, though not always decisive, wealthy
interests collectively serve as a systematic check and prod on the political branches, the political parties, and on the administrative state,
88
fundamentally shaping their interactions.
A. Organized Wealth in Politics
Concern about the relationship between wealth and democracy is
89
not a new feature of American political discussion. But it is now,
once again, at the center of public debate. One can easily theorize
why: After a period of relative shared prosperity following the New
Deal and World War II, income inequality has returned to pre-New
90
Deal levels. The data from economists are striking. Since the 1970s,

86
87
88
89

90

vice providers have been pushing the F.C.C. for looser regulation of broadband access,
while technology startups, joined by “a corporate alliance with subtle interests in [the
regulatory] fight,” has been lobbying for more muscular regulation); Peggy Lowe, Hundreds of Lobbying Interests Influenced the Farm Bill, NETNEBRASKA.ORG (Jul. 14, 2014, 6:30
AM),
http://netnebraska.org/article/news/927265/hundreds-lobbying-interestsinfluenced-farm-bill (noting that food companies and energy interest lobbies were on
opposing sides in the 2014 Farm Bill debate over ethanol production); Amy Schatz,
Google, Wireless Industry Not Down With Marriott’s Wi-Fi Blocking Plan, RE/CODE (Dec. 22,
2014, 12:31 PM), http://on.recode.net/1zcxv0y (describing how Google, Microsoft, and
the wireless industry are opposing the hotel industry’s efforts to gain the F.C.C.’s permission to block personal Wi-Fi networks on their properties).
Gilens & Page, supra note 5, at 571.
Id. at 571, 575.
The impact of money on the third branch, the judiciary, is also substantial, as discussed in
Part IV.B.
See, e.g., ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, 132–35 (1976) (noting
that the penultimate draft of the Declaration of Rights that began Pennsylvania’s constitution warned that excessive accumulation of land or wealth is “dangerous to the Rights,
and destructive of the Common Happiness” of the community); CHARLES EDWARD
LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 171
(1977) (arguing that the political power of large private corporations undermines democratic responsiveness to any other interest in society). For a discussion of these sources
and the broader constitutional dimension of debates about oligarchy and democracy, see
generally Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, & The Constitution
of Opportunity:
A Story of Two Traditions, NOMOS (forthcoming 2015), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2620920.
PIKETTY, supra note 4, at 20–27; see also Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner Take-All
Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the Unit-
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incomes of the poor and middle class have stagnated, while the overall economy has expanded and the wealthy, particularly those at the
91
Notably, the shift of revery top, have become even wealthier.
sources has been sustained, with both income and wealth inequality
92
increasing steadily since around 1980. The trend is not obviously
related to either the business cycle or to control by a particular party
93
in Washington.
As economic inequality has soared, so too has political inequality.
Putting aside, for the moment, the normative question of whether
dominance of the wealthy in politics and governance is problematic

91

92
93

ed States, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 152, 155 (2010) (“That income inequality has grown substantially over the past thirty years is no longer in dispute.”). For a description of the literature
documenting the growth of economic inequality, see KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL.,
THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 71 n.5 (2012). While inequality is a problem in other nations as
well, the United States ranks far worse than most of its peers. The United States has one
of the highest levels of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient before taxes and
transfers, among the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”). Timothy M. Smeeding, Public Policy, Economic Inequality, and Poverty: The United States in Comparative Perspective, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 955, 958, 962 (2005).
When government taxes and benefits are taken into account, American inequality is
comparatively even greater. Id. at 961–63; SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra, at 77–78. Furthermore, while our tax and transfer system is still progressive, it has grown less so over time.
According to the CBO comprehensive income data, since 1979, inequality rose twentythree percent before taxes and transfers and thirty percent after. Notwithstanding some
significant progressive innovations, like the EITC, taxes and transfers are less effective at
ameliorating inequality now than they were in 1979. See Jared Bernstein, Why Christie’s
Adviser is Wrong on Economic Inequality, THE STAR-LEDGER (Jan. 5, 2014, 7:47 AM),
http://blog.nj.com/njv_guest_blog/2014/01/why_gov_chris_christies_advise.html.
The most comprehensive data on income inequality comes from economists Thomas
Piketty and Emmanuel Saez. See generally Thomas Piketty & Emmanual Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2003). For updated tables and
figures for 2014, see http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2014prel.xls). On wealth inequality, see KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN RICH 122–23 (2002) (illustrating that 40% of assets and 12–20% of U.S. income is controlled by the top 1% of the American population); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra
note 90, at 75–76 (articulating that wealth has always been more unevenly divided than
either earnings or household income). On increasing productivity and work hours during the period of economic stagnation, see Jared Bernstein & Karen Kornbluh, Running
Faster to Stay in Place: The Growth of Family Work Hours and Incomes, NEW AM. FOUND. WORK
AND FAMILY PROGRAM (2005). A recent study predicts that by 2016, the richest one percent is likely to control more than half of global wealth. DEBORAH HARDOON, WEALTH:
HAVING
IT
ALL
AND
WANTING
MORE,
OXFAM
2
(January
2015),
http://www.oxfam.org/en/research/wealth-having-it-all-and-wanting-more.
Picketty & Saez, supra note 91, at 17.
Hacker & Pierson, supra note 90, at 156; cf. NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA:
THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY & UNEQUAL RICHES 2 (2006) (arguing that rising partisanship
helps produce economic inequality). For further discussion of the relationship between
wealth concentration and partisan control, see infra Part II.C.
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94

and why, the evidence of such dominance is substantial. Consider
first the disparate participation of economic elites as individuals. At
every stage of the electoral and governing process, wealthy Americans—those in the top SES quintile—participate at higher levels than
95
their lower-income counterparts. They vote at higher rates, they
contribute more frequently and in greater amounts to campaigns,
they volunteer more frequently on political campaigns, and they are
96
more likely to contact a representative about an issue. The gap between wealthy Americans’ participation in politics and that of other
Americans, which narrowed in the post-New Deal period, has widened in recent years, particularly as expressed by campaign donations. For example, just three decades ago, the top .01% gave about
10% of all campaign contributions; now they are responsible for
97
40%.
As top incomes have increased exponentially, the wealthy
98
have had more money to spend on electoral politics. Meanwhile, a
series of recent decisions from the Supreme Court has made it easier
for the wealthy to contribute greater sums of money and to do so
99
anonymously. In addition, wealthy individuals are, and have always
94
95

96
97
98

99

See infra Part IV.A.
The average amount of political activity rises steeply across five quintiles of SES.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 6–8, 14; see also id. at 122, 122 n.8, 136, 169, 197
(demonstrating that the higher the SES quintile to which a person belongs, the more
likely he or she is to vote, contribute money to a campaign, engage in political discussion
daily, be more persistently politically active over time, and to have come from a politically
engaged family).
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 136.
Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 103, 111–12 (2013).
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 175. Indeed, more money was spent in the 2012
election than ever before: federal candidates and independent supporters spent more
than $6 billion on campaigns. Nicholas Carnes, Who Votes for Inequality?, (unpublished
manuscript) (manuscript at 9), http://people.duke.edu/~nwc8/Carnes_Who_Votes_for_
Inequality.pdf (“In the House, the average incumbent raised $1.2 million; in the Senate,
incumbents raised roughly $11 million each.”); see also DAVID CALLAHAN & J. MIJIN CHA,
STACKED DECK: HOW THE DOMINANCE OF POLITICS BY THE AFFLUENT & BUSINESS
UNDERMINES ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 1 (2013), http://www.demos.
org/sites/default/files/imce/StackedDeck_1.pdf. (noting the disparity between the participation of the affluent compared to less wealthy Americans).
See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (“[W]e have
made clear that congress may not regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount of
money in politics, or to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance the
relative influence of others.”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
371–72 (2010) (holding that corporations have a First Amendment right to spend money
to support or denounce candidates in elections); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S.
724, 741 (2008) (striking down regulation that sought to balance spending against selffunded millionaires). Election spending has spiked since these decisions. See Seth
Masket, Are the Super-Wealthy Buying Democracy?, MISCHIEFS OF FACTION (May 16, 2014),
http://www.mischiefsoffaction.com/2014/05/are-super-wealthy-buying-democracy.html
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been, far more likely to serve as elected and appointed leaders than
100
are lower-income Americans.
However, the extent to which wealth dominates our system of
governance only becomes clear when we shift focus from the individual to the collective—or, in Madisonian terms, to the level of faction.
Two important points: First, individuals in the top SES quintile participate in organized political groups at substantially higher rates
101
than other Americans, across every domain of organized interest ac102
tivity. As social scientists have explored, the affluent are better able
to afford the financial costs of organization, and to command the
skills, acquire the information, and cultivate the media necessary to
103
keep organizations running.
Second, and more important, business organizations overwhelmingly dominate political activity in Washington. The majority of politically engaged groups in Washington are organized around economic
goals and interests, and of such groups, those representing business
104
constitute more than two-thirds. More than three-quarters of money reportedly spent on lobbying goes toward representing corporate
105
America—a total of $2.57 billion in 2012. And “there is good reason to believe that [these numbers] significantly undercount the true

100

101
102
103

104

105

(demonstrating a spike in contributions following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United).
Millionaires make up only 3% of the population, but they have a majority in the House of
Representatives and a filibuster-proof super-majority in the Senate. At the same time,
people with manual labor and service industry jobs have made up more than half of the
population since the start of the twentieth century, yet people from such backgrounds
have never held more than 2% of the seats in Congress. NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE
COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CLASS IN ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 7
(2013). For more discussion on this subject, see Russ Choma, Millionaire’s Club: For First
Time, Most Lawmakers are Worth $1 Million-Plus, OPENSECRETS BLOG (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/01/millionaires-club-for-first-time-mostlawmakers-are-worth-1-million-plus/ (noting that for more than half of Congress are
millionaries); Stephen Lurie, Why It Matters That Politicians Have No Experience of Poverty,
THE
ATLANTIC
(June
2,
2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/why-it-matters-that-politicianshave-no-experience-of-poverty/371857/ (pointing out that nearly 200 members of Congress are multimillionares).
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 276.
Id. at 320.
For discussion of why the wealthy are better able to organize, see id. at 313; E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 35 (1960).
See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 320, 322 (noting that “[m]ore than two-thirds of
the organized interests in Washington are institutions or membership associations directly related to the joint political concerns that arise from economic roles and interests” and
those representing business constitute more than three quarters of these).
DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 8–9.
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corporate investments in politics, given that so much political influ106
ence activity is not covered by lobbying disclosures.”
While business has always been engaged in politics, organizations
representing business interests have proliferated and expanded their
107
collective capacity over the last forty years.
Very few companies,
prior to the 1970s, had their own lobbyists; even at the trade association level, political engagement was limited by contemporary stand108
ards. With each passing year, corporate America has spent more on
109
Today, large
lobbying and has expanded its political operations.
corporations have achieved “a pervasive position that is unprecedent110
ed in American political history.”
Moreover, according to some
theorists, as businesses assumed this dominant position in Washington, their ideological cast also changed: The more “moderate” and
public-minded manufacturing-based businesses of the 1950s were replaced by more conservative and narrowly focused financial organiza111
tions.
The participation in politics and governance by business organiza112
tions dwarfs participation by other interests : Business groups and
their trade associations both far outnumber and far outspend organizations representing working and poor Americans and diffuse public
113
interest groups. Indeed, while business organizations have become
106
107

108
109
110
111

112
113

Id. at 9.
Hacker & Pierson, supra note 90, at 177. The Chamber of Commerce, for example, doubled in membership between 1974 and 1980, as did the National Federation of Independent Business. The Business Roundtable, designed to mobilize high-level CEOs for
the advancement of shared interests, formed in 1972, and has been active since. Id. at
176. In addition, “[t]he number of corporations with public affairs offices in Washington
grew from 100 in 1968 to over 500 in 1978. In 1971, only 175 firms had registered lobbyists in Washington, but by 1982, 2,445 did. The number of corporate PACs increased
from under 300 in 1976 to over 1,200 by the middle of 1980.” Id. While small businesses
figure prominently in political rhetoric, representatives of large businesses dominate in
Washington. See John M. de Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, Advancing the Empirical
Research on Lobbying, 17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 163, 165–66 (2014) (arguing small businesses
are less likely to lobby for interests compared to large businesses).
DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 9, 55–71.
Id.
Id. at 1.
See generally MARK S. MIZRUCHI, THE FRACTURING OF THE AMERICAN CORPORATE ELITE
(2013) (comparing the corporate elite of today’s world with the corporate elite of the
post World War II industrial world).
See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 439 (noting that participation via amicus briefs in
litigation is one exception).
DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 9. One study found “that 72 percent of expenditures on lobbying originate with organizations representing business.” SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note
90, at 442. Another concluded that “[l]obbying expenditures by corporations and trade
associations represent over 84% of total interest group lobbying expenditures at the U.S.
federal level . . . .” de Figueiredo & Richter, supra note 107, at 165. A single business
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both more prevalent and more sophisticated in their political activity,
countervailing organizations have atrophied. “At various points in
American history [public interest groups and unions] served as
114
meaningful political counterweights to corporations.” No longer.
Beginning in the 1960s, and accelerating in subsequent decades,
membership organizations of ordinary Americans built in the Pro115
gressive and New Deal Eras declined in number and scope. That is
not to say that non-business groups altogether disappeared from the
landscape. In fact, the 1960s and 70s saw the founding of numerous
public interest organizations, along with the rise of transformative social movements. But for the most part, the organizations that endured past the 1980s were professionally managed advocacy groups,
dominated by the elite. Today, less than a third of the organizational
advocates operating in Washington are membership associations of
any kind, and only about an eighth are membership associations of
116
individuals.
Thus, even the comparatively few organizations purporting to represent the public interest are dominated by the wealthy
and funded primarily by large donors. Gone are the days when cross
sections of Americans participated in governance decisions through
117
their representative organizations.
Unions are one notable exception; their membership and funding
is still drawn from working Americans. And unions have continued
to participate at every level of politics and government, often provid-

114
115

116
117

group, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, spent $1.166 billion lobbying the federal government between 1998 and 2014, compared to $628 million by all labor unions combined. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Spending Database—Top Spenders 1998–2015,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=a&
indexType=s (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Spending Database—Labor, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php?id=
P&year=a (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). The top three healthcare industry groups spent
more than three times as much on lobbying during this period as AARP. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Spending Database—Top Spenders 1998–2015, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=a&indexType=s (last visited Oct.
9, 2015); Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Spending Database—AARP,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=
D000023726&year=2014 (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 9–10.
See SKOCPOL, supra note 5, at 135–38 (discussing the origins of the civil rights movement,
the feminist movement, and the modern environmental movement and the simultaneous
decline of membership organizations). See also ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 27 (2000) (arguing that Americans
have been increasingly disconnected from one another).
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 319.
Kate Andrias, Hollowed-Out Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L.J. ONLINE 48, 50 (2014). For a discussion of how these trends affect political parties, see infra Part II.C.
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ing a countervailing voice to organized business groups. Since the
1970s, however, the labor movement’s size and power has shrunk
119
considerably. Meanwhile, over the last decades, labor unions have
often focused more on their own members’ immediate interests than
120
on broad-based political goals.
In short, countervailing organizations that might be expected to
121
check the power of organized business have not kept up.
Unions
remain politically active and continue to provide substantial campaign donations, but because there are so few of them and their
funding is increasingly under attack, they do not represent a signifi122
cant share of organizational activity in politics and governance.
Meanwhile, new organizations representing poor and middle-income

118

119

120
121

122

As political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson write, “[w]hile there are many ‘liberal’ groups in the universe of organized interests, labor has been the only organized interest focused on the broad economic concerns of those with modest incomes.” Hacker &
Pierson, supra note 90, at 186.
See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 87–89. In the 1950s, roughly one in three workers in the United States belonged to a labor union. Id. Since then, union density has
fallen precipitously. In 2010, around 11.9% of Americans were in unions; within the private sector, the rate in 2010 fell to about 6.9%. Id. For a discussion of causes of the decline, see RICHARD B. FREEMAN, AMERICA WORKS: THE EXCEPTIONAL U.S. MARKET (2007).
See Katznelson, supra note 32, at 190–92, 204.
In recent years, business organizations have consistently comprised between ninety and
ninety-five of the top 100 lobbying organizations, as measured by lobbying expenditures;
in four of the last fifteen years not a single public interest group or union has appeared in
the list of top 100 organizations. DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 12–13. In 2012, business organizations spent $34 for every $1 spent by public interest groups and unions combined.
Id. at 13. Political activities that are not disclosed in lobbying expenditures, such as talking to the press, coalition building, and grass-roots lobbying, however, are not included in
these figures. Id. at 14. But there is no evidence that unions and public interest organizations even the spending disparity when such activity is considered. Id.
See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 368 (explaining that the decline in private-sector
union membership and relative increase in “educational attainment of union members”
may be related to “a weakened political voice on behalf of the economic interests of those
lower down on the economic ladder”); Hacker & Pierson, supra note 90, at 179–80 (discussing how the decline in organized labor has diminished the political voice of middle
class Americans). In 2012, corporations spent $2.57 billion on reportable lobbying expenditures, which amounted to fifty-six times the amount spent by unions. DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 8–9, 14. Recent legislative and court decisions prohibiting unions from collecting fees from objecting workers, while maintaining the obligation that unions
represent such workers, further weaken unions’ economic and political position. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (holding that the agency-fee provision of Illinois’s
Public Labor Relations Act, which required non-union Medicaid-funded homecare personal assistants to pay fees to the union representing such assistants, violates the First
Amendment).
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Americans have not filled the void. Such groups register barely a
123
trace in studies of the organizational landscape of government.
B. Organized Wealth in the Branches
The Framers of our Constitution, and Madison in particular, were
124
concerned about the concentration of state power in few hands. As
James Willard Hurst described the sentiment some years ago, “[w]e
don’t want to trust any group of power holders to be judges upon the
125
ends for which they use the power or the ways in which they use it.”
“All forms of organized power over men’s wills should in some way be
accountable to serve ends of broader concern that the purpose of the
126
power holders.”
One mechanism to diffuse power was the separation of functions
127
across three branches of government.
The branches, at least according to the schematic version of American constitutionalism,
would check one another in a way that respected the powers and prerogatives of each. Through the branches, “ambition [would] be
128
made to counteract ambition.” Consistent with this account of separation of powers, courts have frequently declined to decide separa123

124

125
126
127

128

See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 357 (noting that organizations that represent the
interests of lower-income Americans only accounted for a small percentage of the organizations involved in Washington politics).
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 60 at 301 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one,
a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 60, at 308
(James Madison) (stating that the central challenge faced in designing governance institutions is to assure “‘practical security’ . . . against the excessive concentration of political
power”).
James Willard Hurst, Problems of Legitimacy in the Contemporary Legal Order, 24 OKLA. L. REV.
224, 225 (1971).
JAMES WILLARD HURST, JUSTICE HOLMES ON LEGAL HISTORY 29 (1964).
In referring to this conception of separation of powers as “Madison’s conception,” I
adopt the dominant description in the literature but take no position on whether Federalist No. 51 accurately or fully reflected Madison’s thoughts on the matter. Accord Bradley
& Morrison, supra note 54, at 438–39 n.112 (declining to take a position on whether Federalist No. 51 accurately portrays Madison’s thoughts on the separation of powers) (citing
Samuel Kernell, “The True Principles of Republican Government”: Reassessing James Madison’s
Political Science, in JAMES MADISON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT 92, 93 (Samuel Kernell ed., 2003)) (arguing that the “Madison Model” of
checks and balances in Federalist No. 51 is not a true reflection of Madison’s views on the
Constitution).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 60. Such competition would police institutional
boundaries and prevent tyrannical collusion. One of the virtues of this approach, Madison explained, is that it would not require that government officials act responsibly and
police themselves. Rather, the model reflects a “policy of supplying, by opposite and rival
interests, the defect of better motives.” Id.
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129

tion of powers controversies.
Instead, they have deferred to the
branches themselves to reach political accommodations, except when
130
one branch threatens to aggrandize itself at the expense of another.
But, of course, as Madison himself recognized, the branches of government are not political actors with interests and wills of their own.
Rather, the behavior of the branches is a product both of institutional
structure and of the wills and interests that motivate the individual
131
officials who populate them.
There are many different constituencies, experiences, and interest
groups that shape the wills and motivations of the leaders of government. But money is central to the story. Campaign spending is the
most familiar mechanism by which wealth influences the political system. Wealthy individuals expend vast sums of money on campaigns
through independent campaign spending and direct campaign con132
tributions. Confirming long-held intuitions, recent empirical studies demonstrate that such spending results, at the very least, in great133
er access to members of Congress and their staffs.
Other scholars
conclude that money does much more, ultimately resulting in the
134
corruption of Congress.

129
130
131

132

133

134

Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915,
950 (2005).
See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727
(1986).
See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 249 (1992) (arguing against the use of legislative intent on the
ground that individuals, not Congress as a collective, have intentions and purpose); Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2317 (arguing that the government does not have interests of its own, but rather government behavior is driven by the wills and interests of individual government officials). As scholars have pointed out, the Madisonian model never
made clear precisely how tension and competition between the branches were supposed
to operate. The model assumes that differences in election and tenure among the
branches would foster desired attachment, but it does not provide a mechanism by which
the interests of actual public officials would be channeled into maintaining the role for
their respective branches. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2317; see also M. Elizabeth
Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1158 (2000)
(arguing that formal mechanisms such as the presidential veto and senate confirmation
power do not guarantee a balance of power).
See, e.g., Confessore et al., supra note 5 (explaining that a small number of wealthy individuals are responsible for a siginificant percentage of campaign finance donations for
the 2016 presidential election).
Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Individuals: A Randomized Field Experiment, AM. J. POL. SCI., Jan. 2015, at 11 (providing results from a study that demonstrate that contributions by organized interests can
help increase access to policy makers).
See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 6, at 89, 91 (arguing that congressional corruption is largely a
result of the dramatic increase in campaign finance).
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But while campaign spending has occupied a great deal of attention from the public and legal scholars, it is only a small piece of the
135
puzzle. Indeed, businesses focus far more energy and resources on
strategies other than campaign spending. One recent study reports
that almost thirteen times more money is spent on lobbying and re136
lated forms of political persuasion than on campaigns.
The business of persuading members of Congress to particular
positions is multilayered and complex. Corporate and trade association lobbyists provide information in the legislative process by
“call[ing] attention to issues, furnish[ing] evidence about how problems are being experienced on the ground, and provid[ing] expertise about the anticipated consequences—both substantive and politi137
cal—of proposed solutions.” In this way, business lobbyists make it
easier for members of Congress to support certain policies; they “sub138
Indeed, the legislative system relies on
sidize” the work involved.
the provision of expertise by industry lobbyists. Congressional staffers
often lack the expertise and the time necessary to perform the detailed analysis lobbyists supply; staffers are often young, stretched thin
over a number of issue portfolios, and less experienced than most
139
lobbyists with whom they engage.
Through sophisticated campaigns, organized business groups also
supply pressure and mobilize congressional allies to take or block ac140
tion on particular issues. And, increasingly, corporations are invest135

136

137

138

139
140

In the past couple of years, election law scholars have focused more attention on lobbying. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying,
13 ELEC. L. J. 160, 160 (2014) (discussing the four goals of lobbying regulation, which are
“protecting the right to lobby; preventing improper influence; restricting some unfair
opportunities for influence; and promoting transparency of lobbyists’ activities”); see generally Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191
(2012) (arguing that lobbyists threaten economic welfare by facilitating rent-seeking activities and lobbying for legislation that is not an efficient use of resources); Zephyr
Teachout, The Forgotten Law of Lobbying, 13 ELEC. L. J. 4 (2014) (analyzing the lobbying
cases of the nineteenth and early twentieth century courts).
Lee Drutman, Despite Citizens United, Elections Aren’t A Good Investment for Corporations,
WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/despitecitizens-united-politics-isnt-a-good-investment-for-corporations/2015/03/27/f13e0d20d26c-11e4-ab77-9646eea6a4c7_story.html.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 271. See also de Figueiredo & Richter, supra note 107,
at 5 (finding that “corporations and trade associations comprise the vast majority of the
lobbying expenditures by interest groups”).
See de Figueiredo & Richter, supra note 107, at 5 (noting that lobbying expenditures by
corporations and trade associations at the federal level accounts for “over 84% of interest
group lobbying expenditures”).
DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 33–34.
Id. at 25–26; see also de Figueiredo & Richter, supra note 107, at 164 (“If we assume, following most of political economy literature, that a politician’s objective function is com-
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ing large sums in saturating the intellectual environment in order to
influence policymakers and staffers. The goal, lobbyists report, is to
141
legitimate certain arguments, ideas, and solutions. When countervailing organizations respond, they can be quite effective. But, as discussed above, they do so with a sliver of the resources and with declining numbers. On less salient and more complex issues, well-funded
142
business groups are often the only real lobby.
That elected officials are themselves affluent, frequently having
served as leaders of or counselors to large business organizations, also
works to shape the wills and interests of the branches. Officials bring
143
their own beliefs and ideologies to bear on decisions they make.
More often than not, these ideological positions are relatively sta144
ble.
Perhaps not surprisingly, empirical work demonstrates that
legislators from “profit-oriented jobs in the private sector . . . tend to
vote more conservatively on economic issues, especially compared to
145
lawmakers who spent time in blue-collar jobs.”
While those who study campaign finance and lobbying have focused primarily on Congress, wealthy individuals and business organizations pervade the process of governing in the executive branch as
146
well. Campaign spending obviously plays a role in presidential elec147
tions, and presidents, like members of Congress, have almost all
148
been drawn from the elite.
But wealth saturates the non-elected
executive branch bureaucracy too, undermining many of the assump-

141
142
143
144
145

146
147

148

prised of re-election to the current office, promotion to higher office, and ideological
pursuits, then the politician seeks information on how her position on a given issue or issue set will affect those outcome variables.”).
DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 36–37.
See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 285–87 (stating that many of the issues addressed
by lobbyists for business interests were “relatively narrow and low-profile”).
MCCARTY ET AL, supra note 93, at 21.
See id. (“For the period covered by this book, there are only very small changes in legislator [ideological] positions.”).
Carnes, supra note 98, at 11. Wealthier legislators are also less likely to vote to repeal the
estate tax, while legislators who are heavily invested in the stock market are more likely to
vote to protect the market from regulation. Notably, states with more of these lawmakers
have higher rates of economic inequality. Id. at 11–12.
KEN GODWIN, ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICYMAKING: THE PUBLIC PURSUIT OF PRIVATE
INTERESTS 207–08 (2013).
See, e.g., BLAIR BOWIE & ADAM LIOZ, BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY: THE UNPRECEDENTED
ROLE OF MONEY IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS, DEMOS 3 (2013), http://www.demos.org/
sites/default/files/publications/billion.pdf (revealing campaign spending in the 2012
presidential election cycle was over $2.6 billion).
See, e.g., Douglas A. McIntyre, The Net Worth of The American Presidents: Washington To
Obama, 24/7 WALL ST. (May 17, 2010), http://247wallst.com/banking-finance/
2010/05/17/the-net-worth-of-the-american-presidents-washington-to-obama/.
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tions of scholars who celebrate internal or administrative separation
149
of powers.
Classic capture theory teaches that regulated industries enlist key
members of Congress and the President to pressure agencies to
promulgate favorable regulations or to shelve less favorable pro150
posals; they do so by lobbying elected officials while promising fi151
nancial or other support for reelection efforts.
Because of their
scant presence and their comparative resource weaknesses, public interest organizations are unable to curb the influence of organized
152
business interests.
Stated as such, capture theory is obviously flawed: Neither Congress nor the President is a puppet of a particular industry group, nor
are the agencies mere pawns of their political overseers. Meanwhile,
agencies differ from one another, making some more susceptible to
capture than others: Some face a concentration of industry groups,
the absence of countervailing organization, and a disputed mission,
149
150

151

152

See infra Part III.C.
See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 12
(1971) (discussing “the costs” regulated industries must pay to obtain certain regulations); see generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (discussing the concept of “pressure
groups”). I use the term “classic” to refer to these works’ position in the legal canon, for
although the Chicago School and Stigler are often cited as the originators of capture theory, they were preceded by accounts of public corruption from the fields of political science and history, and before that by recognition of the problem of private interest in
public governance that dates back to the founding. See William Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST
INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 25 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014).
On the way in which industry groups contribute to political campaigns and lobby in order
to obtain influence with executive agencies’ legislative overseers on the relevant oversight
committees, see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991). See also LAWRENCE C. DODD & RICHARD L. SCHOTT,
CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 103 (1979) (“[I]nterest groups [help] both
the legislators and the bureaucrats by wining and dining them, lavishing benefits on
them, giving them occasional insider information about investments, and, in the case of
legislators, providing them with the financial support necessary to re-election.”);
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1490 (2003) (explaining that an oversight committee’s actions “can
obstruct and delay the agency’s agenda” and influence its decisions); Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1685–86 (1975)
(contrasting classic capture theory with “subtle” explanations of industry expectation or
systematic bias); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 779,
792 (1983) (asserting “that firms located in districts represented on FTC oversight committees are favored in the commission’s antitrust decisions” and that “[t]he statistical evidence implies that the FTC is remarkably sensitive to changes in the composition of its
oversight subcommittee”).
See supra notes 114–23 and accompanying text.
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while others regulate diverse entities, enjoy (or endure) participation
from organized countervailing groups, and have a clear statutory mis153
sion. The recent experience with net neutrality is but one example
154
of how the wealthiest organized groups do not always win out.
Nonetheless, the empirical and theoretical research overwhelmingly supports a theory of “soft” capture in the executive branch.
Wealthy interests engage the administrative state at every level, and
155
with significant effect. Industry groups participate actively in the
regulatory process, meeting with high-level agency officials and lowerlevel staffers and participating in reviews of proposed rules and regulatory-analysis documents before the Office of Management and
156
Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”).
Throughout the process, industry officials provide not only opinions,
157
but also information about how the regulated industry functions.
Particularly where agency activity involves complex and non-salient
issues, under-resourced public interest and worker groups are less
158
likely to provide contrary information.
Well-financed groups are
153

154

155

156

157

158

For a discussion of the relationship between capture and agency design, see Rachel E.
Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV.
15, 22–23 (2010).
See Rebecca R. Ruiz & Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Votes to Regulate The Internet As a Utility, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2015, at B1–B2 (discussing the F.C.C.’s decision “to regulate broadband
Internet service as a public utility” to ensure that “the Internet is not divided into . . . fast
lanes . . . for [those] who can afford it and slow lanes for everyone else” but noting industry’s presence on both sides of the issue).
Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284–85 (2006) (discussing the process by which interest groups
secure favorable regulations); see also Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory
Capture and Empowerment, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 435, 437–39 (1991) (describing various
ways in which regulated entities interact with regulators).
McGarity, supra note 40, at 1671 (“When the agency publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking, the regulated companies typically dominate the public-comment process. They
submit reams of material and lengthy briefs explaining why disfavored regulatory alternatives are unlawful, unduly burdensome, unsupported by the available technical studies, or
unlikely to achieve the agency’s desired goal.”); see also Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation
in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1295–1315 (1986) (describing how the evolution of judicial review of agency rulemaking opened the door to industry challenges);
Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 206 (1974) (“It
has been widely assumed that [the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of judicial review] is
applicable to informal rulemaking.”).
See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 464 (1999); Stewart, supra note 151, at 1713–14 (explaining
that industry officials often provide information because “agency staff resources are normally limited in comparison to industry resources”).
See Willian T. Gormley, Jr., Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System, 18 POLITY 595, 606–
07 (1986) (“When issues are highly complex and not very salient, conditions are ripe for
policymaking by a power elite. The public is virtually excluded from the policymaking
process, because the issues are too obscure and too abstruse.”); McGarity, supra note 40,
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also able to monitor agencies and challenge administrative decisions
159
All else being equal, agencies
that will negatively affect them.
would prefer not to become mired in legal challenges. Thus they often seek to work with, rather than against, business groups, particularly when countervailing organizations are absent or weak and where
the agency’s actions are unlikely to capture sustained public atten160
tion.
Agency officials also often anticipate entering or returning to employment with the regulated industry once their government service
161
terminates. As a result, public choice theory posits that they either
consciously or subconsciously avoid aggressively pressing an agenda
in opposition to the interests of the regulated industry. Although this

159

160

161

at 1745–47 (describing how asymmetries in influence and information favor industry over
public interest groups and individuals).
See Barkow, supra note 153, at 22 (“[R]egulated industries are well-financed and wellorganized, especially when compared to the general public and public interest groups.
Industry groups are thus better positioned to monitor agencies closely and to challenge
any and all agency decisions that will negatively affect them.”); McGarity, supra note 40, at
1675–76 (“The industry, meanwhile, carefully monitors and frequently interacts with the
agency as the agency sets its regulatory agenda.”); see also Bagley & Revesz, supra note 155,
at 1298 (“[I]ndustry will have an advantage in monitoring agencies and in setting off
[fire] alarms when its interests are threatened.”); Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups
in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 245, 252–57 (1998) (“Between 66.7 percent and 100 percent of the comments
received were submitted by corporations public utilities, or trade associations.”);
Seidenfeld, supra note 157, at 464 (discussing means by which “regulated industries and
interest groups with strong central staffs still occupy a favored position in regulatory and
political structures that allows them an advantage in influencing agency decisions”);
Wendy E. Wagner et al., Air Toxics in the Board Room: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Hazardous
Air Pollutant Rules, 9–10 (Ariz. Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 10-01, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443531 (describing how regulated parties are “heavily engaged—and in a greater proportion than public intrest groups—in attempting to influence the substance” of the comment process). See generally Stephen Croley, Theories of
Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (summarizing studies showing that regulated interests participate to a much greater extent than
public interest groups).
Barkow, supra note 153, at 22–23. See also Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest
Group Participation in Rule Making: A Decade of Change, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
353, 361 (2005) (finding that businesses are participating twice as much as public interest
groups); Seidenfeld, supra note 157, at 464 (“A regulated entity frequently is a large corporation with resources to appeal agency decisions at every level.”).
See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 342 (1986) (discussing “the revolving door” and problems associated with it);
Christopher N. Camponovo, Indecent Proposal: Abraham Sofaer, Libya, and the Appearance of
Impropriety, 21 J. LEGAL PROF. 23, 27–29 (1997) (discussing benefits and problems associated with “the revolving door”); Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, What Do Revolving-Door
Laws Do?, 55 J.L. & ECON. 421, 421 (2012) (“Plans to pursue a subsequent career in the
private sector may induce current public employees (for instance, regulators) to treat potential private sector employers favorably.”).
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“revolving door” theory does not hold up in all contexts—for example, an aggressive track record as an enforcer can actually be a useful
selling point when looking for post-government employment—the
close affinity between regulators and industry at the very least shapes
162
perspectives among policymakers.
Finally, wealthy individuals and business organizations wield influence over government not only through traditional mechanisms of
“capture” but also through actual responsibility for privatized gov163
ernment functions. In countless privatized areas of administration,
outside firms are hired to administer the laws and programs whose
164
substance they have already shaped. In addition, in a wide range of
areas, industry is actually responsible for writing the federal regulatory standards that govern. Known as “incorporated-by-reference” rules
or standards, these industry standards are incorporated into law only
165
by reference and available to the public only at a charge. Through
both of these mechanisms—private administration of government
functions and private writing of government regulations—economic
elites and their organizations thus exercise a degree of direct control,
as well as indirect influence, over government’s operation.
In short, business groups and wealthy individuals provide donations, information, and expertise, populate the ranks of government,
and work to shape the intellectual and policy debate. This does not
mean they “capture” Congress, the President, or the agencies. Government and government officials still often serve, or try to serve, a
166
public interest. Countervailing groups still mobilize or try to mobi-

162

163

164

165
166

Compare David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507,
530–39 (examining post-employment of prosecutors in the Southern District of New York
and concluding that prosecutors who go on to private sector careers do not tend to do
the bidding of those they regulate while in public service) with Law & Long supra note
161, at 435 (reasoning that future employment hopes may influence public officials to favor industry).
See Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and Limits of Privatization, 123 HARV. L. REV. 890, 895–96
(2010) (reviewing GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009)) (“There can be no doubt that
the last few decades of our nation’s history have seen the privatization of many activities
that were previously regarded as the preserve of public authority.”).
See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 719, 727 (2010) (discussing the increasing use and effects of privatization and government “workarounds”);
Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 989 (2005) (discussing the degree
to which the U.S. military has increased the scope and scale of its reliance on private security companies in recent decades.).
Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control Over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory
Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 739 (2013).
See Daniel Carpenter & David Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:
SPECIAL INTEREST AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1, 11–12 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds.,
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167

lize. But business organizations and wealthy individuals are ubiquitous at every step of the process. They continually check and balance—or prod and plea with—governmental actors, working to define the scope of public debate and the shape of governmental policy.
C. Organized Wealth in the Parties
Still, if political parties have replaced the political branches as the
primary mechanism for political competition, then perhaps none of
the above matters for constitutional structure. On this view, the political parties provide a distinct mechanism for political competition, a
mechanism uninfected by, or at least unrelated to, the problems discussed above. In reality, however, wealthy individuals and business
organizations pervade not only the political branches, but also the
political parties. Any account of how the parties function as mechanisms of political competition thus must consider the role of money.
The two major parties in America draw support from different
segments of the population, often dividing on class lines as well as on
168
the basis of geography, race, and age. Yet both parties obtain most
169
And the leadof their donations from “the richest communities.”
ers, nominees, and appointees from both parties are themselves
overwhelmingly wealthy, with deep connections to corporations and
170
the financial sector.

167
168

169

170

2014) (distinguishing between “strong capture,” which is uncommon, and “weak capture,” which is ubiquitous).
DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 43–44.
See Delia Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman, Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization
and Trends in American Public Opinion 114 AM. J. SOC. 408, 440 (2008) (noting “the persistent importance of traditional social cleavages of class, race, and religiosity in determining voting behavior”); Andrew Gelman et al., Income Inequality and Partisan Voting in the
United States, 5 SOC. SCI. Q. 1203, 1204 (2010) (describing partisan differences in voting
by income).
James G. Gimpel et al., The Political Geography of Campaign Contributions in American Politics,
68 J. POL. 626, 629–30 (2006) (“[B]oth parties turn to the richest communities in the
country for the bulk of their itemized contributions, and the wealthiest citizens provide
those funds far out of proportion to their share of the population.”).
See, e.g., Matt O’Brien & Darla Cameron, Elizabeth Warren Was Right: The Links Between
Citigroup and Government Run Deep, THE WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/12/16/elizabeth-warrenwas-right-the-links-between-citigroup-and-government-run-deep/ (noting that seven highlevel officials in Democratic administrations have worked at Citigroup before or after
their government service). Even the recent Tea Party Movement, self-avowedly populist
in nature, was funded in large part by billionaires. See Frank Rich, The Billionaires Bankrolling the Tea Party, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, at WK8 (discussing the “sugar daddies who are
bankrolling” the American Tea Party).
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Meanwhile, contemporary political parties lack a grass-roots structure that facilitates participation by ordinary Americans. Today’s political parties are relatively skeletal organizations, particularly as compared to political parties in most other countries and to our own
171
parties at other points in history. They do not, for example, require
172
regular payment of party dues or other forms of participation. Instead, party membership usually means simply checking a box on a
voter registration card. Progressive Era reforms, such as the stateimposed requirement that political parties select nominees through
primary elections, along with (salutary) prohibitions against political
patronage, have weakened mechanisms that parties previously used
173
to encourage rank-and-file participation. Indeed, today, at the national level, the formal parties function primarily as campaign service
174
vendors and fundraising entities.
And as the influence of Super
PACs and other large-donor entities has increased within the ecosystems of the parties writ-large, the role of party activists and formal
175
party leadership structures has declined.
Not only are the active participants and funders of the two political parties wealthy, but on economic redistribution issues, these voters tend to agree, at least more so than the standard narrative suggests. Recent empirical work demonstrates that elite Americans place
a much lower value on equality than other Americans, even when
176
they self-identify as progressive Democrats.
Relatedly, there is less space between the parties—or key segments
therein—than the standard account in the separation-of-powers liter-

171

172
173

174

175

176

See LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN MOLD 144–47 (1986) (comparing American party organizations with other countries and addressing evolution of American parties over time).
Id. at 144–46.
See Pildes, supra note 39, at 813, n.21 (describing doctrinal changes that led to these reforms and arguing that the result was a rise in political fragmentation and a decline of
control by party leaders).
Andrias, supra note 117, at 48–49 (citing Daniel J. Galvin, The Transformation of Political
Institutions: Investments in Institutional Resources and Gradual Change in the National Party
Committees, 26 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 50, 52, 57–59 (2012)).
See Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over: McCutcheon, Shadow Parties,
and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 176–77 (2015) (discussing the
growing financial role of Super PACs and shadow party groups and how these “outside
groups have taken over many of [the official parties’] functions”). On the parties as ecosystems, with different power centers, nodes of influence, and multiple points of entry,
see generally Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and
Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571 (2012) and Michael S. Kang, The
Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131 (2005).
Raymond Fisman et al., The Distributional Preferences of an Elite, 349 SCIENCE 1300, 1300
(2015), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/349/6254/aab0096.full.
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ature would suggest. In the legal literature, the account is of two
highly ideological and cohesive political parties, representing two
ideological poles. One party is liberal, the other conservative, with
177
great difference between them.
Recent political science scholarship shows that, in fact, party polarization has been asymmetric and
uneven, particularly on economic issues. Rising inequality is a major
178
factor in this asymmetric polarization.
Behavioral changes have
largely been driven by the re-positioning of the Republican Party,
with House Republicans in particular moving dramatically to the
Right since the 1970s, a period during which economic inequality has
179
increased.
During this same period, congressional Democrats as a
group have moved only slightly to the left, and the shift has occurred
largely because of the disappearance of conservative Southern “Blue
Dog” Democrats. Those Democrats remaining in office and their
successors have not themselves shifted substantially left, particularly
180
on economic issues.
Meanwhile the Democratic platform has at
least episodically moved away from “general welfare issues to issues
based on ascriptive characteristics (race, gender, and sexual prefer181
ence) of individuals.”
More importantly for this Article’s focus, both parties have shifted
182
toward more neoliberal economic policies or market conservatism.
177

178
179

180
181

182

Legal scholars who focus on partisanship tend to describe the parties as fierce and equal
contenders, representing two poles of public opinion. See, e.g., Levinson & Pildes, supra
note 9, at 2332–38 (“Partisan competition in government now means a Democratic Party
dominated by liberals, with few moderates and no conservatives, pitted against a Republican Party dominated by conservatives, with few moderates and no liberals.”).
See MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 93, at 71–109 (advancing income inequality as a major
factor in polarization).
Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENTS IN POLITICS 19, 21 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013); Nolan
McCarty, et al., Polarization is Real (and Asymmetric), THE MONKEY CAGE (May 15, 2012),
http://themonkeycage.org/2012/05/polarization-is-real-and-asymmetric/. On the move
of the Republican Party to the right, see JACOB HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKEALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON
THE MIDDLE CLASS 171 (2010); MANN & ORENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 51–56.
McCarty, et al., supra note 179.
MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 93, at 11. Among other explanations for the shifting focus of
the Democratic Party is the transformation of the labor movement, beginning in the
1940s, from a broad based social movement focused on the state to an interest group focused on private collective bargaining. See Nelson Lichtenstein, From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era, in THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930–1980, at 122, 122–52 (Steve Fraser & Gary
Gerstle eds., 1989) (examining trade unions, labor, and the role of Progressives in generating reform for growing inequalities in power and income).
See, e.g., Bonica et al., supra note 97, at 104, 106–07. The “slight liberal drift” of the Democrats has been “compositional in nature,” with moderate Democrats from the South being replaced by conservative Democrats. Id. at 106. Meanwhile, both parties have experi-
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As political scientists Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole and various coauthors have shown in a series of studies, while the Democrats are still
more closely allied with labor and lower-income voters, both parties
have experienced an ideological shift toward acceptance of a “form of
free market capitalism” which offers “less support for government
183
provision of transfers, lower marginal tax rates, and deregulation.”
Though to different extents, for the last several decades, key segments of both parties have shared the view that the primary job of
184
government is to protect financial markets and financial interests.
To be sure, there are substantial differences between the positions of
the Democratic and Republican Parties on economic and social welfare issues, and these positions continue to evolve, with Democratic
leaders showing renewed interest in populist policies over the last
couple of years. But the scope of that disagreement is different than
the dominant story of hyper-polarization would suggest.
Moreover, because of our constitutional structure, wealthy interests need only exercise a degree of bipartisan influence to serve as an
effective check on government: They need only exercise sufficient
185
influence across the parties to be able to exploit critical veto points.
Accordingly, business interests, in particular, tend to contribute strategically to members of both parties in order to obtain influence over
186
key chokeholds.
Studies on the campaign activity of the financial

183
184

185

186

enced an ideological shift toward acceptance of a “form of free market capitalism” which
offers “less support for government provision of transfers, lower marginal tax rates, and
deregulation.” Id. at 104. For discussion of Democratic and Republican party shifts in
recent years, see generally HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179; MCCARTY ET AL., supra note
93; Thomas Byrne Edsall, The Changing Shape of Power: A Realignment in Public Policy in
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930–1980, at 269–70 (Steve Fraser & Gary
Gerstle eds., 1989) (“The past twenty years, in effect, produced a policy realignment in
the absence of a political realignment. The major beneficiaries of this policy realignment
are the affluent, while those in the bottom half of the income distribution, particularly
those whose lives are the most economically marginal, have reaped the fewest rewards.”).
See, e.g., Bonica et al., supra note 97, at 104, 106–07.
See Edsall, supra note 182, at 270–71; James K. Galbraith, The Surrender of Economic Policy,
THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001), http://prospect.org/article/surrendereconomic-policy (“Across the spectrum, all declare the main job of government is to help
markets work well.”).
For an account of parties as ecosystems, with different power centers, nodes of influence,
and multiple points of entry, see Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Two Trends
That Matter for Party Politics 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 32, 35 (2014) (citing Kang, supra
note 175 and Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and
Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571 (2012)).
See Phillip Bump, Democrats Who Voted For the Cromnibus Have Received Twice as Much Money
From the Finance Industry as the ‘No’ Voters, WASH. POST THE FIX (Dec. 12, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/12/12/democrats-who-votedfor-the-spending-bill-have-received-twice-as-much-money-from-the-finance-industry-as-the-

456

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:2

industry illustrate the dynamic: Financial industry members contribute in great numbers and great amounts to political campaigns of
candidates from both parties. But they target money where it is likely
to have the most influence. They give, in particular, to members on
the Financial Services Committee of both parties, who are likely to set
the legislative agenda, and they give to the more economically conservative wings of each party, who are most aligned with the policy
187
positions of the industry.
Historical and empirical work regarding the relative positions of
Democrats and Republicans on measures designed to ameliorate inequality and regulate business confirms the success of the strategy:
Through money and organization, wealth has been able to eliminate,
from decisive sectors of both political parties, support for redistribu188
tive measures and greater regulation of the corporate sector.
Though the Democratic Party and Republican Party advance opposing positions on many economic issues, key members do not, particularly with regard to low-salience issues of concern to organized business. The parties diverge substantially, but wealth influences enough
members of both parties to narrow the effective gap in practice.
D. A Coda: Outcomes for Governance
While it is clear that economic elites and large business organizations pervade the political parties and the political branches, it is
harder to measure how precisely their participation affects outputs.
Political theorists have long worried that “those with greater property

187
188

no-voters (discussing strategic donations by the finance industry); AMERICANS FOR
CAMPAIGN REFORM, MONEY IN POLITICS: WHO GIVES (2010), http://www.acrreform.org/
wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Fact-Sheet-Who-Gives.pdf (finding that, in the 2010 election cycle, “[i]ndustry giving to the two major political parties was roughly even across
sectors”).
See NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLITICAL BUBBLES: FINANCIAL CRISES AND THE FAILURE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 83–85 (2013).
See, e.g., Carnes, supra note 98, at 19–21 (exploring data that show the relationship between socioeconomic status and legislation); Edsall, supra note 182, at 270 (discussing
policy realignment and its affect on different socioeconomic classes). The recent vote on
the Cromnibus bill provides a vivid example. See supra note 186 (describing greater total
campaign contributions for Democrats who voted for a spending bill than Democrats who
did not). For a discussion of the ways in which wealth influences the conservative legislative agenda, see Jane Mayer, Covert Operations: The Billion Brothers Who are Waging a War
Against Obama, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 2010, at 45–46, 55 (discussing the growing political influence of the Koch brothers); Peter Hamby, Company Men: The U.S. Chamber
Flexes Its New Political Muscle, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/politics/
hamby-midterms-chamber-tea-party (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (describing the increasing
influence of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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and wealth” would capture “the electoral process to their ad189
Earlier empirical work provided only sporadic support
vantage.”
for this notion, with some prominent scholars concluding that government outcomes favoring the wealthy cannot be explained by a
failure of democratic responsiveness. Rather, poor Americans, like
their wealthy counterparts, simply did not favor downward redistribu190
tion or restrictions on corporate power.
More recent empirical research, however, provides substantial
support for theorists’ concerns that government is ultimately more
responsive to both wealthy individuals and organizations representing
business interests. Most notably, in a recent study of two decades of
congressional lawmaking, Martin Gilens found that “under most circumstances, the preferences of the vast majority of Americans appear
to have essentially no impact on which policies the government does
191
or doesn’t adopt.”
Other researchers’ work in the last few years
192
confirms these conclusions.
The extent to which the views of wealthy Americans diverge from
those of lower-income Americans is disputed. On many issues there
appears to be little divergence. But recent studies suggest that the
general public is more amenable than the wealthy to a variety of policies designed to reduce inequality and strengthen economic opportunity, including raising the minimum wage, increasing the Earned
Income Tax Credit, providing greater unemployment benefits, and
193
directly creating jobs. For example, only 40% of the wealthy think
189

190

191
192

193

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 360 (1993); see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 310 (1983) (“The most common form
of powerlessness in the United States today derives from the dominance of money in the
spehere of politics.”). For a discussion of this strand of political theory, see Sachs, supra
note 26, at 159–60 (2013).
See generally JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, WHAT’S FAIR?:
AMERICAN BELIEFS ABOUT
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1981) (finding, through qualitative interviews, significant ambivalence among working-class Americans about downward redistribution). For an overview
of these debates, see WHO GETS REPRESENTED? (Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien,
eds., 2011); Jennifer Hochschild, Winner-Take-All Politics: A Review Essay, 126 POL. SCI. Q.
315, 318 (2011) (reviewing JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL
POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE
MIDDLE CLASS (2010)).
MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL
POWER IN AMERICA 1 (2012).
See generally LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
NEW GILDED AGE (2008); CALLAHAN & MIJIN CHA supra, note 98; GILENS, supra note 191;
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179; SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90.
See generally Benjamin I. Page, et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans,
11 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 51-73 (2013) (comparing preferences of wealthy Americans
with lower-income Americans). Affluent voters are also less supportive of labor unions
and less likely to support laws that make it easier for workers to join unions. See JOHN
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the minimum wage should be high enough to prevent full-time workers from living in poverty, while 78% of the general public holds this
194
view. A similar gap exists with regard to tax policy: A recent study
found that 73% of Americans making under $20,000 believed that
the gap between rich and poor should be reduced, even if achieving
that goal requires higher taxes, compared to 54% of Americans mak195
ing over $100,000. Even where the wealthy, middle class, and poor
agree on policy, they prioritize differently. Polls over the past several
years have repeatedly found that addressing unemployment, creating
jobs, and improving the economy are priorities for lower-income
Americans, while higher-income Americans rank reducing the deficit
196
as their top priority.
Irrespective of the degree of divergence in views, when divergence
occurs, members of Congress tend to respond to the views of wealthy
individuals, from whom they regularly hear, as opposed to those of
lower- and middle-income Americans, who participate much less and
197
do so with less money and organization.
For example, Gilens’s
study found that federal legislators “consistently appear to pay no attention to the views of millions of constituents in the bottom third of
198
the income distribution.” When preferences between the rich and
the poor diverge, “government policy bears absolutely no relationship
199
to the degree of support or opposition among the poor.”
Even
when middle-class preferences align with those of the poor, Congress
200
is responsive to the affluent and not to the poor and middle classes.

194
195
196

197
198
199
200

HALPIN & KARL AGNE, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, STATE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY, 2009: A NATIONAL STUDY OF POLITICAL VALUES AND BELIEFS 30 (2009),
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/03/pdf/
political_ideology.pdf (finding “attitudes toward unions are closely tied to education, with
college-educated Americans of every ideology being 6-to-12 points less likely to agree”
that unions are important). The affluent are also significantly less inclined than other
groups of Americans to support an active role for government in addressing mass unemployment. Enns & Wlezien, supra note 190.
CALLAHAN & MIJIN CHA, supra note 98, at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5–6, nn.6–8 (collecting polls). Results of a pilot study of the Survey of Economically
Successful Americans (“SESA”) showed that 87% of affluent households believed budget
deficits were a “very important” problem, the highest percentage of all listed problems.
Page et al., supra note 193, at 54.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 6.
BARTELS, supra note 192, at 282.
GILENS, supra note 191, at 81.
Id. at 84. Gilens concluded that representational inequality is genuinely rooted in economic inequality and cannot be reduced to partisan bias, and he noted the dwarfing of
small donations by affluent donors to political campaigns. Id. at 247–48.

Dec. 2015]

SEPARATIONS OF WEALTH

459

Business organizations similarly affect legislative outcomes. Gilens
and Page found that organizations representing business in governance are relatively cohesive in their positions on economic policy
questions in ways that correlate negatively with the preferences of av201
erage citizens.
And, along with their wealthy owners and leaders,
business groups substantially affect legislative outcomes, whereas the
scant groups representing ordinary citizens have little aggregate ef202
fect.
This should not be surprising given that, as previously discussed, the composition of the U.S. interest groups is heavily tilted
toward corporations and business associations and business groups
203
are by far more active and better funded. And the trends hold no
204
matter which party is in power. The related data on economic distribution is consistent: Inequality has increased more quickly during
205
Republican administrations, but it has also increased during peri206
ods of Democratic control. And the gap has widened during both
207
divided and unified government.
Wealthy interests also shape regulatory outcomes, though here
the role of business is far greater than that of wealthy individuals.
Agency responsiveness to the desires of the industry or groups being
regulated is well modeled as a theoretical matter and well document208
As Richard Stewart has observed, “[i]t
ed as an empirical matter.
201
202
203

204
205

206

207
208

Gilens & Page, supra note 5, at 574.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 574–75; see also supra notes 113–23 and accompanying text. Gilens and Page’s research is consistent with prior studies showing a clear bias in legislative outcomes to the
wealthy. E.g., BARTELS, supra note 192; FRANK BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND
POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY (2009).
GILENS, supra note 191, at 178; Gilens & Page, supra note 5, at 573–74.
Scholars attribute this to differences in macroeconomic and tax-and-transfer policies. See
BARTELS, supra note 192, at 31–34, 104–05 (citing and extending the research in
DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR., THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY: MACROECONOMICS AND
ELECTORAL POLITICS (1987) and Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. & Christopher Dennis, Income Distribution in the United States, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 467–90 (1988), which indicates Republican macroeconomic policies are the culprit, and citing EDWARD R. TUFTE, POLITICAL
CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY (1978) as confirmation of the effects of Republican transfer
policies).
See Lane Kenworthy, How Much Do Presidents Influence Income Inequality? 53 CHALLENGE 90,
92–96, 103–08 (2010) (reviewing Bartels’s research but finding that inequality has also increased under Democratic administrations since the 1970s). Notably, the relationship between the President’s party and patterns of income growth weakened considerably after
the 1970s when the organizational landscape of American politics shifted. Since the
1970s, income inequality has risen sharply and the correlation between the President’s
party and movement in inequality has been much weaker than in earlier years. Id. at 107.
Id. at 92.
See ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL
PROPOSALS: A STAFF PAPER 99–100 (1971) (explaining that capture happens most often
when an agency assigns undue weight to the interests of the regulated industries as
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has become widely accepted, not only by public interest lawyers, but
by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency
members, that the comparative overrepresentation of regulated or
client interests in the process of agency decisionmaking results in a
209
persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.” That is not to say
agencies fail to regulate in the public interest at all, but they often
become closely identified with and dependent on the industries they
210
are charged with regulating. Several different researchers find systematic biases that favor regulated parties in rules promulgated by
several different agencies. The bias exists even in agencies like the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) that are generally viewed
211
as resistant to traditional forms of agency capture. Of course, it is
sometimes hard to identify when an agency decision is the product of
undue interest group pressure as opposed to an exercise of the agen-

209

210
211

against those of the public); Croley, supra note 126, at 5 (describing the concept of agency capture as an essential component of the public-choice theory of regulatory process,
which maintains that agencies cater to the regulatory needs of well-organized interest
groups). For helpful overviews of capture, see PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN
FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981); Bagley & Revesz, supra note 155, at 1260; Stewart,
supra note 151; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL. J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
Stewart, supra note 151, at 1713 quoted in Barkow, supra note 153, at 21–22; see also Stewart,
supra note 151, at 1685 (“At its crudest, this thesis is based on the ‘capture’ scenario, in
which administrations are systematically controlled, sometimes corruptly, by the business
firms within their orbit of responsibility, whether regulatory or promotional.”). For cases
discussing regulatory capture, see, for example, Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d
483, 499 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that “regulatory agencies are subject to the phenomenon
known as ‘agency capture’”); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 418 (1st Cir.
1988) (describing agency capture as the “undesirable scenario where the regulated industry gains influence over the regulators, and the regulators end up serving the interests of
the industry, rather than the general public”).
Merrill, supra note 33, at 1060 (citing MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 79–94 (1955)).
Martino Golden, supra note 126 (studying rules promulgated by federal agencies using
content analysis to determine private citizen comment participation and organized influences on federal regulations and finding no citizen group engagement in five of eight
rules promulgated by EPA); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 108–09 (2011) (citing
Maureen L. Cropper et al., The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of
EPA Decision Making, 100 J. POL. ECON. 175, 178, 187 (1992)) (examining interest group
engagement in pesticide registrations between 1975 and 1989 and finding environmentalists participated in forty-nine percent of the cancellations); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan
Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 131, 133 (2006) (studying forty lower-salience rulemakings promulgated by four different federal agencies and finding that business interests submitted 57%
of the comments, whereas nongovernmental organizations submitted 22% of comments,
only 6% of which were submitted by public interest groups).
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212

cy’s independent judgment.
But notwithstanding limitations of
public choice theory, there is little dispute that, overall, organized
business and wealthy interests participate at far greater rates than
others, and with significant effect.
III. ASSESSING THE “FIFTH BRANCH”: THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZED
WEALTH ON EXECUTIVE POWER AND LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY
The focus thus far has been on the extent to which wealth influences the political branches, the political parties, and the executive
branch bureaucracy. This Part builds on that analysis, demonstrating
that existing descriptive accounts of executive and legislative power
need revision. It shows that because of the influence of wealth on a
host of important issues, unified government is more constrained in
its output than dominant constitutional theories suggest; gridlock is
more biased in its operation and results; and internal checks are less
effective at diffusing concentrated power and enabling innovation
than proponents assert.
To be clear, the partisanship story dominant in the law review errs
not because it expressly asserts hyper-polarization on economic matters. Rather, the literature typically speaks in generic terms about intense polarization, without considering the role of wealth. That is,
those who write about government dysfunction frequently evoke partisanship in expansive terms without drilling down into where and
when issues are polarized—and where and when they are not. In the
words of one recent piece, “In our highly polarized system, it some213
times seems like we disagree on everything.”
The number of recent articles invoking hyper-polarization or intense partisanship as the cause of government dysfunction, without

212

213

See, e.g., Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 111th Cong. 6–7 (2010) (statement
of Nicholas Bagley, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Michigan Law Sch.) (“Capture
is . . . often very hard, if not impossible, to reliably identify.”). Public choice theory can
be taken too far. Theorists err to the extent they define the legislative process as merely
an arena for fundamentally self-serving behavior or to the extent they fail to recognize
the plurality of interests and motivations at play. For critiques of public choice theory of
regulation, see generally DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994); Mark
Kelman, On Democracy Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of
the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic
Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990).
Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113
MICH. L. REV. 57, 96 (2014).
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214

qualification, is significant.
And where the constitutional governance literature does recognize that wealthy interest groups and campaign money play a role in shaping partisanship, and in shaping governance, it tends to treat the dynamic as an exception to the basic
215
rule, rather than as a systemic feature. Meanwhile, although some
theorists have recognized that actors both internal and external to
the government check partisan government—actors such as the me216
dia, watchdog groups, and foreign governments —even these accounts tend not to consider the systematic role played by wealthy in217
218
terests. As shown below, the picture drawn is incomplete.
A. Unified Government
A central preoccupation of separation of powers and administrative law scholars is the growth of executive power over the last centu214

215

216

217
218

For just a few recent examples, see Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2015) (describing “intense political polarization and partisan
disagreement over policy” as leading to nonenforcement); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 235 (2015) (claiming our “age of divided and polarized government” has made it more difficult for the executive branch to respond to challenges with
new legislation and identifying “pooling” of administrative resources as a tool to address
those challenges).
Levinson and Pildes, for example, contend that association with a “party is likely to be the
single best predictor of political agreement and disagreement.” Levinson & Pildes, supra
note 9, at 2324–25. And although they concede that “[o]n certain aspects of trade and
environmental policy, for example, the relevant cleavages may correspond more closely
to geography and interest-group support than to party,” id. at 2324, they treat the role of
organized business interests on those issues as an unusual exception from the rule. Gillian Metzger acknowledges that economic inequality has helped contribute to polarization,
but she too emphasizes that “[t]he signal characteristic of national politics today is increasing political polarization.” Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607, 1610, 1630–31 (2015).
See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
9/11 (2012); ERIC A POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2011); Ashley Deeks, Checks and Balances from Abroad, U. CHI. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 549 (2000).
But see Michaels, supra note 164, at 719 (describing various privatization practices as “executive aggrandizing”).
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for example, use financial reform as a key example of
how the executive is unconstrained by inter- and intra-branch checks, but checked by political forces. But they fail to consider the distribution of political power with respect to
financial regulation. They point to the importance of whistleblowers, and general political backlash, barely mentioning the outsized role money plays in government. Perhaps
for this reason, they are much more sanguine about the effectiveness of existing checks.
See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 216; cf. GOLDSMITH, supra note 216 (describing various forms of watching and checking the presidency in the form of courts, members of
Congress, human rights activists, journalists, lawyers, watchdog groups, whistleblowers,
and others in the context of the war on terror).

Dec. 2015]

SEPARATIONS OF WEALTH

463

ry. Supporters of a strong, unitary executive celebrate the trend.
They contend that the Constitution creates a hierarchical executive
branch, with the President empowered to direct administration of all
219
federal laws. Others are less convinced that the Constitution’s text
compels a strongly unitary executive, but assert that a powerful Executive is permissible, when authorized by Congress, and necessary to
respond to exigencies of modern life. These theorists celebrate the
distinct capacities of the executive: the ability to access vast amounts
of information, act quickly and decisively, and adapt to changing circumstances. Numerous scholars, along with many Presidents and ex220
ecutive branch lawyers, advance this view. A third group worries intensely about the rise of executive power, arguing that expanded
presidential authority poses a grave threat to the future of the United
221
States’ government.
As a positive matter, however, there is little dispute: Our executive has expanded greatly since the Founding, and particularly so in
222
recent years. Scholars point to partisanship as one explanation for
why executive power has so expanded: During times of unified party
government, the executive, beholden to a highly polarized and ideologically coherent party, pushes an aggressive, politically extreme legislative agenda. Congress is not only willing to enact partisan policy,

219

220

221

222

See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550 (1994) (rejecting the theory that the concept of a unitary executive stemming from the Framers is a myth). For a history of the unitary executive theory, see generally Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A
Developmental Perspective of the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070 (2009).
For a recent and particularly robust expression of this view, see generally POSNER &
VERMEULE, supra note 216. Others who emphasize the capacity of the Executive to respond to modern exigencies include Kagan, supra note 53, at 2255–56; Lawrence Lessig &
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85–86 (1994).
See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 3. See also PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW
EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009) (arguing that presidents’
increasingly assertive claims to unilateral authority have subverted constitutional checks
and balances).
See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 120 (“[T]oday, both major parties are in love with the
presidency.”); Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1384
(2012) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010)) (“Thus, presidential power expanded through
liberal hands for most of the century, and just as liberals began to have second thoughts,
conservatives propelled the expanding presidency further.”). At the same time, Jerry
Mashaw has demonstrated the degree to which the administrative state preceded the New
Deal. JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 (2012) (“[T]here has been no precipitous fall from a historical position of separation-of-powers grace to a position of compromise; there is not a new administrative constitution whose legitimacy should be understood as not only contestable but deeply problematic.”).
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but is more likely to delegate power to a fellow partisan and is unlikely to check abuses of that power. As a result, across administrations,
during periods of unified government, the administrative state ex223
pands and the executive operates with few checks.
The problem is that this account is essentially undifferentiated. It
speaks about presidential power and hyper-polarization in general
terms. As a result, it implies that partisanship explains government
action across issue domains, and that executive power’s expansion is
trans-substantive. As discussed in Part II, however, polarization has
224
been asymmetrical between the parties and uneven across issues.
Because of organized wealth’s systematic influence, executive power
on a host of issues is more constrained, or differently constrained,
than partisanship-focused law review literature on executive power
would suggest.
The constraints imposed on unified government by wealth should
be evident from Part II. Through campaign donations, lobbying, and
participation throughout the bureaucracy and administrative process,
wealthy individuals, businesses, and their organizations effectively
check governmental efforts that oppose their interests, even during
periods of unified government. And, indeed, empirical research suggests that proposals contrary to business interests, advanced during
periods of unified government, have fared particularly poorly. Democratic administrations, which have pushed such proposals more frequently, thus appear to fare worse in terms of legislative output dur225
ing periods of unified government.
Recent experience illustrates the point: When, during the first
years of the Obama Administration, both the executive and legislative
branches were controlled by Democrats—with a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate—the parties-not-powers theory would suggest that
we should have seen a great deal of legislation, easily passed. According to the theory, such legislation should have expanded the power of
the executive immensely and should have advanced a hyper-partisan

223

224
225

WILLIAM HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL
ACTION 179–80 (2003). For legal scholarship discussing this trend, see Bradley & Morrison, supra note 54, at 443; Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2348–49; Marshall, supra
note 49, at 519; Pildes, supra note 2, at 326, 333.
See supra Part II.C.
See DAVID R. MAYHEW, PARTISAN BALANCE: WHY POLITICAL PARTIES DON’T KILL THE U.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 66, 78–79 (2011). David Mayhew has found that during unified
government Republican presidents have a 71.4% probability of success with high-priority
proposals, compared with Democrats’ 42.1%, though he has advised against
overinterpreting the data. Id. at 79.
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226

liberal agenda. To some extent, that account holds up: The legislative achievements that preceded the Democrats’ loss of Congress in
2010, primarily healthcare reform and financial regulatory reform,
were significant progressive reforms. They also were politically polarizing and involved substantial new delegations to the executive
branch.
But when one considers the entire process of enactment, as well as
the legislation championed but not passed during the preceding political campaign, the picture is more complicated.
Both the
healthcare and financial reform laws were far harder to enact than
the model offered by separation-of-parties scholars would have suggested. And the multiple veto gates that made enactment difficult
systematically favored organized wealth, particularly regulated industry. Of course, wealthy interests were not the only groups involved in
the governance process and wealthy individuals and groups were not
monolithic in their views. But money served to constrain in ways that
undermine, or at least amend, the narrative of an unchecked and hyper-partisan executive during times of unified government.
Consider the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Signed into law in July of 2010, Dodd-Frank included “a
package of financial regulatory reforms unparalleled in scope and
227
depth since the New Deal.”
A reaction to regulatory failings
brought to light by the most severe financial crisis since the Great
228
Depression, the Act was politically possible not only because of
popular anger at the banks, but also because of unified government.
But this is only part of the story. Despite both unified Democratic
government and strong popular support, passing the legislation was
immensely challenging. Moreover, the content of the legislation was
systematically influenced by economic elites and business interests
and, particularly in areas of low-light, this influence was largely unchecked by countervailing forces.
Financiers exercised their influence through multiple channels,
consistent with the mechanisms described in Part II. For example,
leading up to the writing of the legislation, they were more active in

226

227
228

To be clear, my argument does not rest on the notion that the Democratic Party is inherently liberal and that it somehow abandoned its true mission. Rather, my claim is simply
that the narrative of hyper-polarization erroneously implies an ideological divide that in
practice either does not always exist or does not always produce the division of powers asserted.
Heath P. Tarbert, The Dodd-Frank Act-Two Years Later, 66 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 373,
373 (2012).
Id.
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229

politics than the average American.
In particular, they were substantially more likely to contribute to ongoing campaigns, including,
230
on occasion, through coordinated campaigns. Their contributions
flowed to members of both political parties, as they targeted key
231
Democrats while rewarding staunch Republican supporters.
Following up on their campaign contributions, the industry spent a great
amount of time and money lobbying. Meanwhile, Congress heard
much less from consumers and their representatives—not surprisingly, for the issues were technically complex and consumer groups were
232
comparatively smaller and less resourced. Meanwhile, past leaders
of finance filled many of the relevant leadership positions of both the
outgoing Bush Administration and the new Obama Administration.
Ultimately, although the banks were not able to stop DoddFrank’s enactment, they were successful at limiting its reforms. This
occurred despite an executive governing with a strong majority in
233
Congress.
In areas of low-light, the banks’ checks and prods were
particularly strong. For example, following the enactment of DoddFrank, Citigroup played a significant role in drafting a bill to exempt
broad swathes of trades from new regulation. The bank’s recommendations were reflected in more than seventy lines of the House
committee’s eighty-five-line bill. As The New York Times reported,
“[t]wo crucial paragraphs, prepared by Citigroup in conjunction with
234
other Wall Street banks, were copied nearly word for word.”

229

230
231
232
233

234

Eighty-eight percent of those employed in finance and insurance reported voting in the
presidential election compared to 76% of other respondents. They were also more likely
to try to influence the votes of others, attend a campaign meeting, rally or speech, and
work on a campaign. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 187, at 78–83 (2013).
Id.
Id. at 83–85.
Id. at 78–80.
See Daniel Indiviglio, 5 Ways Lobbyists Influenced the Dodd-Frank Bill, THE ATLANTIC (July 5,
2010),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/07/5-ways-lobbyistsinfluenced-the-dodd-frank-bill/59137/ (confirming the “watered-down” nature of the final Volcker Rule). Whether or not the original Volcker Rule would have been better policy, the bill simply does not reflect unchecked power of unified government. Rather,
bank lobbyists played a major role in the shaping of the legislation, with little counterbalance from consumers. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 187, at 186–87, 253; see also Kimberly D. Krawiec & Guangya Liu, Pointless Pluralism? An Empirical Study of Volcker Rulemaking (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (undertaking a case study of the
Volcker Rule and concluding that industry representation in formulation of rule dominated).
Eric Lipton & Ben Protess, Banks’ Lobbyists Help in Drafting Financial Bills, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (May 23, 2013 9:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/bankslobbyists-help-in-drafting-financial-bills (adding that “[l]awmakers changed two words to
make them plural”).
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Again, the point is not that the Dodd-Frank Act falls short of
achieving its stated ambitions or that it fails to reform the industry in
a way that will prevent future crises—many experts take that position,
235
while others emphasize the important achievements of the Act. Rather, whatever the final Act’s strengths or failings, what is important
from a separation-of-powers perspective is that, throughout the lawmaking process, the financial industry provided substantial and systematic constraint on unified government, particularly on more
technical issues of low-light, checking and prodding its actions.
Meanwhile, countervailing voices of consumers were much fainter
and more diffuse.
The story of healthcare reform similarly reflects the imposition of
checks by regulated industry on the actions of unified government.
According to nearly all observers, industry priorities fundamentally
structured the healthcare reform bill. At every step in the legislative
process, participation by business interests outweighed that of con236
sumers. And administration officials were frank that, in their view,
the bill’s ultimate success would depend largely on support from the
relevant business interests, including the insurance and pharmaceuti237
cal industries. To be clear, the healthcare bill was a significant, even
historic, progressive achievement. But the persistent influence of
wealth, particularly business groups, demonstrates the degree to
which unified government is checked—from a particular direction.
235

236

237

See, e.g., MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 187, at 253–54 (explaining that holes and uncertainties remain, despite the Dodd-Frank Act’s new provisions); Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall
Street Safe—From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1539, 1542, 1544, 1629–30 (2015) (asserting that the Dodd-Frank Act is ineffective in achieving its goals); Saule T. Omarova, The
Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for A New Age?, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 83, 84–85 (2011) (claiming that the Dodd-Frank Act falls short of its “stated ambitions”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L.
REV. 951, 954 (2011) (asserting that the Dodd-Frank Act fails in its promise to prevent future taxpayer-funded bailouts).
For discussion of the politics of the bill’s passage see, for example, LAWRENCE R. JACOBS &
THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE REFORM AND AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS
TO KNOW 7 (2010); JILL QUADAGNO, ONE NATION, UNINSURED: WHY THE US HAS NO
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 6 (2005); Elenora E. Connors & Lawrence O. Gostin,
Health Care Reform—A Historic Moment in U.S. Social Policy 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2521–22
(2010); Arthur Daemmrich, U.S. Healthcare Reform and the Pharmaceutical Industry 15 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-015, 2011), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/
Publication%20Files/12-015.pdf;; Alan M. Garber & Jonathan Skinner, Is American Health
Care Uniquely Inefficient? 22 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 27 (2008); Jill Quadagno, Interest-Group
Influence on the Patient Protection and Affordability Act of 2010: Winners and Losers in the
Health Care Reform Debate, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 449, 449 (2011).
Jonathan Cohn, How They Did It, NEW REPUBLIC (May 21, 2010),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/75077/how-they-did-it.
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Moreover, to the extent these two high-profile pieces of legislation
support the partisanship theory of the separation of powers—and
they do to a point—they are atypical. Despite the presence of a super-majority during President Barack Obama’s first year, there were
few legislative accomplishments on policies aimed at reducing inequality or otherwise opposed by wealthy interests. This includes policies championed by the formal platform of the Democratic Party, the
238
Obama campaign, and the Obama Administration.
For example,
President Obama campaigned on proposals to cap executive compensation, raise and index the minimum wage, and make the tax
code more progressive. Yet proposals to rein in executive pay were
“largely symbolic and fleeting, focused on companies that had taken
239
bailout money and not yet repaid it”; and the minimum wage and
tax reform went nowhere during the period of unified government.
This was true even though these issues captured majority support in
240
opinion polls, particularly from low- and middle-income voters. Of
course, the absence of such legislation can be explained in part by a
lack of time and resources; the government prioritized healthcare
and financial reform and had little bandwidth for more. But that explanation circles back to the role of organized wealth: Part of why
healthcare and financial reform occupied so much time was because
of the political economy sketched above.
Systematic constraints and the shaping of debate by organized
business interests are not a new phenomenon. Like the Obama Administration, recent prior Democratic administrations have rarely enacted legislation opposed staunchly by wealth, even during periods of
unified government—and even after making campaign promises to
241
prioritize such reforms.
A look at the history of labor law reform

238
239
240

241

See 2008 Democratic Party Platform, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78283 (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179, at 279. On the Obama legislative agenda and the role
of lobbyists, see id. at 278–85.
See BARTELS, supra note 192, at 230 (noting that in thirty-three different national surveys
conducted between 1985 and 2006, support for increasing the minimum wage averaged
80%); Frank Newport, Many Americans OK with Increasing Taxes on Rich, GALLUP (Apr. 25,
2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/106813/many-americans-increasing-taxes-rich.aspx
(noting that over half of Americans believed the government should redistribute wealth
through heavy taxes on the rich); Lydia Saad, In U.S., 71% Back Raising Minimum Wage,
GALLUP (Mar. 6, 2013) http://www.gallup.com/poll/160913/back-raising-minimumwage.aspx (describing majority support for minimum wage over time).
See GILENS, supra note 191, at 178–79, 193–96, 199–200 (showing that the unified Clinton
years were more responsive to high-income preferences than to those of lower- and middle-income Americans); HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179, at 127–32, 278–79 (discussing such legislative failures during the Carter and Obama administrations).
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illustrates the point. The statute governing collective organization of
workers—the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)—was enacted
in 1935 and substantially amended in 1947 with the passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act. Altered in minor ways with the Landrum-Griffin Act
242
of 1959, the text of the statute has otherwise remained unchanged.
On several occasions over the last thirty years, Democratic administrations, governing with Democratic Congresses, have offered major legislation to amend the NLRA.
The motivation for the continued attempts at law reform by Democrats is clear: While globalization and other exogenous factors help
explain the decline of unions in this country, the governing legal regime is also an important cause of their weakness. Put bluntly, the
NLRA, in its current form, fails to protect workers’ ability to organize
243
and bargain collectively with their employers.
The law not only
permits employers to express their opposition to unionization, it also
recognizes their right to compel employees to listen to them in “captive audience” meetings and at the same time to exclude union representatives from the workplace, and it enables employers to use delay tactics aimed at suppressing organization. So, too, existing law
fails to effectively prevent or punish coercive and illegal forms of employer opposition. The incidence of employer law-breaking has risen
244
significantly since the 1970s.
More fundamentally, the Act is mismatched with the structure of
245
the contemporary economy. The statutory regime excludes from its
coverage independent contractors, temporary workers, “knowledge”
workers, and, to some extent, undocumented immigrant workers—
246
precisely those workers that increasingly comprise the labor market.
It effectively permits employers to exclude themselves from the definition of employer and the responsibility of bargaining by contract242
243

244
245

246

Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1532–
33 (2002).
To some extent, the failure of the governing statute to protect workers can be traced to
early Supreme Court decisions that “deradicalized” the original Wagner Act and that reintroduced into the labor law many of the common law doctrines that the Act was meant
to repudiate. See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265–70 (1978). See also
JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 9–10 (1983) (discussing early Supreme Court cases). Congress ultimately entrenched many of these decisions with the Taft-Hartley Act.
Estlund, supra note 242, at 1536–37.
See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION
FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 119–21 (2004) (discussing how modern employment
law’s 1930s roots make it ill-suited for a digital workplace).
See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (defining “employer” and “employee”).
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247

ing out their supply chains.
And because American labor law has
been centered in a single preemptive federal statute, with exclusive
enforcement powers vested in a single federal agency, labor law has
been insulated from other avenues of rejuvenation and reform, mak248
ing federal statutory reform all the more necessary.
Yet, despite the close alliance between the Democratic Party and
the labor movement, Democratic controlled Congresses, under
Democratic Presidents, have been responsible for three major legislative defeats for the labor movement since the 1970s—the period dur249
ing which labor’s organizational strength began to decline.
In
1977, unions made a major labor law reform bill their top political
priority. Large Democratic majorities in the House and Senate and a
250
Democratic president initially committed support. But business interests energetically countermobilized and, although reform passed
the House and commanded majority support in the Senate, the bill’s
opponents were able to sustain a filibuster by picking off a substantial
251
number of Democrats.
Labor law reform during the Clinton Administration met a similar fate, as business again mobilized against a
further weakened labor movement. Pushing for a new social bargain,
the Clinton Administration, through the vehicle of a high-profile
commission, sought a reform package that would have eased restrictions on so-called company unions, while making it easier for
252
workers to organize. But the deal collapsed even before the Republicans captured control of Congress in 1994, with the business community unwilling to countenance the renewed growth of trade unionism even in exchange for concessions that would have produced
253
more flexibility for businesses.
Again, in 2008, President Obama
promised to reform labor law with the Employee Free Choice Act,
247
248

249
250

251
252

253

But cf. Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 186 (2015) (expanding
the definition of “joint employer”).
See generally James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1996); Estlund, supra note 242, at 1527; Paul C. Weiler, Promises to
Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769
(1983).
See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179, at 127–32 (discussing the political battles between
the Carter Administration and business interest groups during the 1970s).
See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN
AMERICA 148–50, 153 (1989) (analyzing the dynamic between organized labor and the
Democratic Party after the 1976 election).
Id. at 150–51, 156 (discussing the circumstances that enabled a filibuster to oppose the
bill).
See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 245
(2002) (explaining the Clinton Administration’s effort to revise labor law in order to ease
the process of organizing labor unions).
Id.
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which would have made it significantly easier for workers to unionize
and would have required arbitration for first contracts. But after the
Chamber and other wealthy and business interests targeted red state
254
democrats, the bill died in a heavily Democratic Congress.
In short, Congress has not enacted broad, redistributive labor law
reforms even under unified governments that purport to support
255
such reform. A similar story could be told about tax law and bank256
ing law, and little progress has been made on environmental law,
given business opposition, even during unified Democratic govern257
ment.
This pattern does not show that the parties are equivalent,
but it does demonstrate the need to revise constitutional theory’s depiction of unified government. Wealth substantially constrains the
actions that even a unified government can take.
B. Divided Government and Gridlock
Along with the growth in executive power, constitutional theorists
worry about the decline of legislative power and the rise of gridlock.
Congress today, many contend, is far more paralyzed than the Framers intended. The reason, theorists explain, is that “when combined
with today’s highly polarized political parties, veto points that once
promoted bargaining and compromise now produce intransigence
258
Again, a bipartisan and trans-substantive account
and gridlock.”
undergirds the story: Gridlock is near universal and the parties are to
259
blame. In practice, however, gridlock is not a substantively neutral
or consistently occurring phenomenon. Although partisanship is
clearly part of the problem, it is an insufficient explanation for the
most worrisome forms of gridlock.
254
255

256
257
258

259

HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179, at 278–79.
See generally Edward McCaffery, The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform, 65 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 21 (2012) (arguing that it is in Congress’s interest financially to periodically review, yet do nothing, about tax reform).
See generally MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 187.
See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179, at 279–80 (discussing the fate of climate change
legislation in the early Obama Administration).
Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System Is Dysfunctional, 94
B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1165 (2014). See also Mark Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary
Thoughts on Identifying and Mending a Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611,
643–44 (2014) (arguing that the contemporary construction of political parties and the
constitutional order leads to excessive blockage and dysfunction).
E.g., Freeman & Spence, supra note 48, at 1–17 (discussing the current state of gridlock
frustrating the administrative process in modern government); Levinson & Pildes, supra
note 9, at 2341 (explaining that divided governments are more prone to gridlock);
Pozen, supra note 1, at 9 (identifying that the current political sphere is characterized by
gridlock and disfunction).
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That is, not all gridlock is equivalent from a constitutional governance perspective. Political inaction due to true and insurmountable policy disagreements between large pluralities may actually reflect
popular will; political action due to equally powerful opposing forces
that represent different sectors of the citizenry may follow the
Madisonian schema of ambition counteracting ambition. Many ex260
amples of partisan gridlock are just that.
But political inaction can also result when power is concentrated
in few hands, without countervailing inputs. Wealth is an important
source of this latter sort of gridlock. There are several reasons why.
First, given our contemporary political economy, wealthy individuals
and business organizations have the greatest capacity to create grid261
lock even when majorities support reform.
Using the range of
mechanisms detailed in Part II—from campaign donations to lobbying to aggressive engagement in the regulatory process—wealth has
the resources to find and exploit veto points. And, as previously
demonstrated, given contemporary American organizational life,
262
countervailing forces are often lacking.
Second, wealth also frequently has the greatest incentive to create
gridlock because it has won at an earlier iteration of the process.
That is, the status quo reflects the distribution of power in previous
263
rounds of the policy process.
Because the status quo reflects the
outcome of prior power dynamics, often with “much greater benefits
going to the privileged and the wealthy than to the needy and the
poor,” changes to the equilibrium tend to reflect changes to the mo264
bilization of wealth. And research suggests that the greatest success
of paid lobbyists occurs when they seek to protect the status quo from
265
a proposed change.

260

261
262
263
264
265

Josh Chafetz, for example, takes issue with the normative aspects of the separation-ofparties theory—the sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, assertion that partisanship’s
effect on governance is something to be concerned about. As he points out, “it would
seem to be a democratic feature of the system, not a bug, that the institutional checks on
that party’s ability to enact its agenda are weaker.” Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of
Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2076–77 n.66 (2013) (arguing that unified versus
divided government should be understood as “dependent . . . on the will of the people, as
expressed through electoral mechanisms”). Accord Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism
and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1124 n.242 (2011) (explaining that a unified government may more effectively express the will of the people).
See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 88–90 and accompanying text.
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 203, at 19–20, 22–23, 240.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 147, 236.
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Finally, the wealthy also have the most power over the changing
market conditions in which law intervenes. That is, legal stasis does
not preclude wealthy interests, particularly large business organizations, from obtaining actual change through private ordering. When
government fails to amend formal rules in the face of changed social
and economic conditions, the result is distinct from preservation of
the status quo. Political scientists Jacob Hacker, Paul Pierson, and
266
Kathleen Thelan term this kind of gridlock “drift.” It occurs when
the circumstances around policies or institutions change in ways that
alter the effects of those policies or institutions on the ground, such
267
that they no longer serve their intended purposes.
Yet, alternative
rules would reduce the degree to which these shifts in outcomes oc268
cur.
In other words, the shifts are potentially remediable, but efforts to update the rules fail. Business interests typically cause and
269
benefit most from this form of gridlock.
Federal wage law illustrates the point. Congress has failed to increase the minimum wage since 2007. At first glance, this looks like
policy stasis. But because the cost of living has increased steadily, in
real terms, minimum wages have declined. Policy has changed
through drift. Moreover, the failure to amend federal minimum
wage law has occurred not because of a deeply divided population
represented adequately by warring political parties or branches.
Opinion polls regularly reflect widespread support for minimum
270
wage increases.
Rather, gridlock in this context has occurred because certain segments of organized business and other wealthy
stakeholders have been able to influence key veto points in Congress
and in the political parties. Through the mechanisms discussed in
Part II, wealth has influenced enough members of both parties and
266

267
268
269

270

Jacob S. Hacker et al., Drift and Conversion: Hidden Faces of Institutional Change, in
ADVANCES IN COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 180 (James Mahoney & Kathleen
Thelen eds., 2015).
Id.
Id. at 190–91.
Hacker & Pierson, supra note 90, at 191 (describing “a clear and important example of
drift—where organized political action effectively prevents the updating of policy in response to changing market outcomes that were advantageous to the wealthy and powerful”).
Press Release, Pew Research Center, Most See Inequality Growing, but Partisans Differ over
Solutions 3 (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/1-23-14%
20Poverty_Inequality%20Release.pdf (citing a national survey which reported that “73%
of the public favors raising the federal minimum wage from its current level of $7.25 an
hour to $10.10 an hour”); Andrew Dugan, Most Americans for Raising Minimum Wage,
GALLUP (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165794/americans-raisingminimum-wage.aspx (reporting that “more than three-quarters of Americans (76%) say
they would vote for raising the minimum wage to $9 per hour”).
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both political branches to stop policy change. Moreover, wealthy interests have not only helped bring about federal paralysis on the minimum wage, but business interests have also benefited most from policy stasis. There are structural reasons why this is so: Because
employers wield greater market power over employment conditions
than do low-wage workers, they need not obtain legislative reforms to
achieve policy goals; they can impose them through private ordering.
The NLRA provides another example: As described above, more
than fifty years have passed without any significant statutory change
271
in the NLRA. At first glance, this looks like a story of balanced partisan gridlock, i.e., of warring interest groups aligned with warring political parties, neither with sufficient power to enact change. On that
view, this is a separation of powers success: Ambition has been made
to counteract ambition. In fact, however, the story is more complicated. Business interests have been able to achieve change without
statutory reform. Through tactics such as outsourcing, subcontracting, and globalizing, they have altered on-the-ground conditions of
employment structures. Of course, businesses may have multiple motivations for such restructuring; nonetheless, one effect is to render
272
the labor law largely impotent. Cynthia Estlund recounts,
The proof is in the political process: While organized labor has mounted
several major efforts at labor law reform in the past thirty years, employers—equipped though they are with all of the political advantages of organization, internal unity, access, and wealth—have made almost no such
efforts since 1959. For the most part, employers who oppose unions and
collective bargaining are willing to bide their time in the political process, batting down periodic reform proposals that might tip the scales in
273
unions’ favor, and watching union strength ebb away.

Similar stories could be told about a host of other policy areas.
Consider environmental law. The Toxic Substances Control Act
(“TSCA”) was passed in 1976 in order “to regulate chemical substances and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury to
274
health or the environment.” Yet after years of rapid technological
advancement, the Act, according to the EPA, is now outdated and

271
272

273
274

See Estlund, supra note 242, at 1535 (“The text of the NLRA has remained virtually untouched since 1959.”); see also supra notes 242–54 and accompanying text.
See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 17–18 (2014) (explaining that fissured workplaces
enable companies to circumvent labor laws); Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1527, 1535 (1996) (explaining that subcontracting allows
for businesses to circumvent traditional employment laws).
Estlund, supra note 242, at 1543–44.
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (1976).
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fails to regulate many potentially dangerous substances.
When efforts at modernization stalled in 2012, business groups rejoiced; one
industry-oriented blogger wrote, “gridlock promises to be the best solution to a heated debate concerning legislation to reform the federal
276
law dealing with chemicals.”
In short, legal theorists and popular commentators are clearly
correct in identifying partisanship as an important cause of gridlock.
But in focusing on partisanship alone, they miss key ways in which
gridlock varies by issue and in effect. Given the contemporary political economy, gridlock is not merely a problem of the parties. Rather,
wealth has both unmatched capacity and incentive to bring about
gridlock.
C. Administrative Checks
Of course, divided government brings not only gridlock but also
presidents and agencies with incentives to push the bounds of formal
power. Faced with intransigent legislatures from the opposing party,
hyper-partisan presidents have found new tools to set policy unilater277
ally, without congressional approval.
Presidents use direct methods, such as executive orders, presidential memoranda, and signing
statements. They also act indirectly, pressing executive branch agencies to advance the Administration’s policy agendas through rulemak278
ing, waivers, guidance policy, enforcement efforts and so on. At the
same time, internal separation-of-powers scholars emphasize, a host
of non-partisan bureaucratic checks constrain such executive ac279
tion.
Thus, according to the dominant narrative, across domains,

275

276

277

278
279

Elizabeth Grossman, What the EPA’s “Chemicals of Concern” Plans Really Mean, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/epa-chemicals-ofconcern-plans/ (reporting that, in late 2009, EPA spokesperson Ernesta Jones expressed
the “EPA’s strong belief that the 1976 law is both outdated and in need of reform”).
Angela Logomasini, When Gridlock Is Good: The Case Of The Toxic Substances Control Act,
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Dec. 6, 2012), https://cei.org/blog/when-gridlockgood-case-toxic-substances-control-act.
See HOWELL, supra note 223, at 179 (studying the rise of various means of direct presidential action and explaining that, “[w]hile it was relatively rare, and for the most part inconsequential, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, unilateral policy making has
become an integral feature of the modern presidency.”). See also Kagan, supra note 53, at
2281–2303 (chronicling use of unilateral power during Clinton presidency); Kate
Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1069–71 (exploring rising use of enforcement as unilateral policy tool).
HOWELL, supra note 223, at 13–14 (identifying how presidents can advance their policy
agendas through persuasion and indirect methods).
See supra notes 10–11.

476

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:2

the President’s use of unilateral power is at once extensive and
checked from within.
While the above story is, in broad strokes, unassailable, it is also
incomplete. Again, the problem is that the account is undifferentiated: it implies that the use of unilateral power is robust and hyperpartisan, no matter what the issue, and that the internal bureaucracy
serves as a neutral, effective check irrespective of substantive content.
It largely fails to consider circumstances where this is not the case.
Yet, as with gridlock, unilateral executive power and internal bureaucratic checks are shaped fundamentally by wealth. Because of their
systematic influence, economic elites, large businesses, and their organizations define both unilateral presidential action and internal
checks on many issues.
Consider executive orders. The partisanship model teaches that,
in this highly ideologically polarized environment, presidents use executive orders to pursue hyper-partisan agendas. The implication of
this theory is that, when government divided in 2010, the Democratic
President should have issued executive orders to advance liberal policies not achievable in Congress. Indeed, on a host of salient issues
President Obama moved forward quickly with aggressive executive actions. The most striking examples were the decision not to defend
the Defense of Marriage Act and to use enforcement discretion to
benefit immigrant children through Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals. These were aggressive and partisan uses of executive power
that polarized the electorate. But both policies were also highly salient and had little opposition from business interests or economic
280
elites more generally.
In contrast, the President’s labor-related executive orders—
including those that aim to raise the minimum wage for executive
branch contracts and impose penalties on contracting employers with
labor and employment violations—were issued a full six years after
partisan supporters called for such action. These orders, like the
others, had strong support from the party’s base. And as a formal le280

Indeed, leading business executives and the Chamber of Commerce advocated immigration reform. See Sheldon Adelson, Warren Buffett & Bill Gates, Op-Ed., Break the Immigration Impasse, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2014, at A25 (showing three business executives publicly
advocating for an immigration reform bill); Ashley Parker, Business-Conservative Alliance
Presses for Immigration Action, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2013, at A16 (reporting on a large group
of business executives advocating to politicians for immigration reform in an event sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce). More than 200 companies, including Citigroup,
Apple, Mars and Alcoa, publicly urged the Supreme Court to overturn the Defense of
Marriage Act. Erik Eckholm, In Gay Marriage Brief, A Corporate Call for Change, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2013, at B1.
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gal matter, they were no more aggressive than the gay rights and immigration orders. The D.C. Circuit has interpreted liberally the President’s authority to implement the contracting law including through
281
imposition of employment-related requirements.
Given the strong support for a minimum wage hike and basic employment rights among the Democratic base, the separation-of-parties
theory would suggest that there should have been a quick issuance of
pro-worker executive orders. Yet the orders were strenuously opposed by the business community and they faced bipartisan inter- and
intra-branch opposition. That is, members of Congress and bureaucratic officials with long-term relationships with the contracting
282
community repeatedly sought to squelch the orders.
Ultimately,
the labor executive orders were issued only after significant countervailing forces mobilized: federally contracted workers repeatedly
went on strike calling attention to their poverty wages, as did workers
283
in other low-wage industries, most notably fast food.
Meanwhile,
popular concern and commentary about economic inequality
mounted.
It should not be surprising that presidential unilateralism has
been cautious on issues opposed by business interests. Recall the
many ways Presidents and their White Houses confront wealth. But
there is considerable tension between this account and the picture of
an unbound and hyper-polarized president. In short, an examination
of presidential actions in light of political economy leads to a more

281

282

283

See, e.g., UAW-Labor Employment & Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 366 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (emphasizing “the necessary flexibility and ‘broad-ranging authority’” given to the
President by the procurement Act); AFL-CIO v. Carmen, 669 F.2d 815, 825 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (holding that the President’s executive action to place a parking charge on federal
employee parking spaces falls within authority granted by Congress); AFL-CIO v. Kahn,
618 F.2d 784, 788, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (upholding the President’s executive action to establish wage and price standards for executive agencies); Contractors Ass’n of
Eastern Pennsylvania v. Sec. of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 162–63, 174 (3d Cir. 1971) (upholding an executive action that required construction companies to submit affirmative action
plans).
Steven Greenhouse, Plan to Seek Use of U.S. Contracts as a Wage Lever, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2010, at A1. Cf. Josh Eidelson, Federal Workers to Strike, March on White House Wedneday,
SALON (Sept. 24, 2013) http://www.salon.com/2013/09/24/federal_workers_to_strike_
march_on_white_house_wednesday/ (noting, in 2013, that a “high road” contracting policy that would have offered companies with higher standards a leg up in securing contracts, was under consideration by the administration in 2010, but “never came to pass”).
See, e.g., Elena Schneider, Food Services Workers Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2014, at A14 (reporting on strikes by hundreds of federally contracted food service workers); Steven
Greenhouse, Fast-Food Workers Seeking $15 Wage Plan Civil Disobedience at Strikes, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2014, at B3 (reporting on nationwide strikes of fast-food workers calling for wages
to increase to $15).
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complicated picture of unilateralism than that depicted in the literature.
When one considers agency action—and the mechanisms of internal separations of power—the impact of money becomes even
more evident: When government does act contrary to organized
wealth, attention shifts to the less visible administrative process.
Return to financial regulatory reform. Despite the broad reach
and several thousand pages of the Dodd-Frank Act, few of its provisions took effect in the summer of 2010. Instead, the details of the
284
Act were left for the federal rulemaking process. That process has
been overwhelmingly dominated by the financial services industry,
with regulators meeting regularly with representatives from big banks
and banking associations, and much less often with consumer and
285
pro-reform groups. The amount of money spent by Wall Street on
persuading regulators and members of Congress during this period
286
also far dwarfed countervailing resources. Meanwhile, the banking
industry provided campaign donations to both Republican and Dem287
ocratic members who had capacity to influence rulemakers.
Meetings and money, of course, do not prove influence. But as
the broader studies discussed in Part II indicate, organized wealth has
284

285

286

287

Tarbert, supra note 227, at 373 (explaining that the Dodd-Frank Act left most of the
rulemaking responsibility to administrative agencies in the years subsequent to the Act’s
passage).
During the year following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, regulators at the three major banking regulatory agencies—the Treasury, the Fed, and the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”)—reported meeting with twenty big banks and banking
associations on average a combined 12.5 times per week. That compares to just 2.3 meetings with reform-oriented groups on average per week. The top twenty banks appear
1,298 times in meeting logs at the three agencies, while groups favoring tighter regulations of the financial markets show up just 242 times. Lee Drutman, Big Banks Dominate
Dodd-Frank meetings with regulators, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION BLOG (July 19, 2012, 4:00 AM)
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/07/19/dodd-frank-two-years-later/. The gap
widened following the first year. With regulators increasingly focused on more technical
rules (e.g., swap exchange facilities, position limits, proprietary trading), regulators met
560 times with the big banks in 2012, but just eighty-one times with reform groups. And
during the first year of rulemaking, regulators met 738 times with the big banks as compared to 161 meetings with the reform groups. Id. See also Nancy Watzman, Ex Post Facto
Lobbying: Banks Blitz Regulators to Soften Dodd-Frank’s Impact, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION BLOG
(Jul. 22, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/07/22/crossborder-lobbying/ (highlighting the number of financial industries met with compared to
reform-oriented groups in the weeks leading up to a Dodd-Frank Act reform deadline).
See Ben Protess, Wall Street Continues to Spend Big on Lobbying, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug.
1, 2011, 2:33 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/wall-street-continues-tospend-big-on-lobbying/ (reporting the vast amount of wealth spent by financial lobbyists
in the wake of Dodd-Frank).
Lipton & Protess, supra note 234 (reporting on the heavy lobbying by financial institutions directed at politicians in both major parties).
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long been successful at moderating the implementation of statutes
through a host of interrelated tactics. And, indeed, the progress of
financial regulatory reform to date suggests that the lobbying by, and
contributions from, the financial industry have been at least partially
effective. At the two-year anniversary date, the deadlines for more
than half of the required rulemakings had expired and regulators
had finalized rules for only one-third of those rulemakings with statu288
tory dates, missing the deadlines for the rest. Sheila Bair, who was
appointed to head the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation by
George W. Bush in 2006 and served in that role until 2011, placed the
blame for regulatory inaction on the resistance to reform posed by an
industry with hundreds of lobbyists and hundreds of millions of dollars to spend: “At the end of the day, the regulators are out289
gunned.”
One striking example of the strength of industry lobbyists is the evolution of the “de minimis exception” to the requirement
that dealers selling derivatives register with the CFTC. The original
proposal was that when a dealer’s annual revenue from credit default
swaps topped $100 million, it would have to register and comply with
a regulatory regime. After the industry weighed in—at the behest of
smaller but still wealthy and well-organized financial players—the exemption was inflated dramatically: the 2013 final rule set a threshold
290
of $8 billion, which would shrink to $3 billion after three years.
While individual legislators sometimes oppose industry’s influence
in the regulatory process, there is little reason to think that Congress
consistently counteracts business’ influence. Indeed, the existing data suggests Congress rarely intervenes on behalf of any diffuse public
291
For example, during recent fiinterest against industry interests.
nancial regulatory hearings, “most of the Democrats on the committee, along with 31 Republicans, came to the industry’s defense, including the seven freshmen Democrats—most of whom have started
to receive donations this year from political action committees of
Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo and other financial institutions, records
292
show.” The literature also provides little to no support for the possibility that the President or the Office of Management and Budget
288
289

290
291
292

Tarbert, supra note 227, at 373.
Gary Rivlin, Wall Street Fires Back, THE NATION, May 20, 2013, at 11, 12, 14 (noting commercial banks such as Wells Fargo, Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase, along with their
trade groups, spent $55 million lobbying in 2010, the year Dodd-Frank became law, $61
million in 2011 and another $61 million in 2012).
Id. at 22; 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a71-2 (2013).
See Wagner et al., supra note 211, at 137 n.128, 142 (examining congressional intervention in context of EPA rulemakings).
Lipton & Protess, supra note 234.
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(“OMB”) regularly intervenes to make agency rules more protective
of the public interest and less protective of business, particularly once
the issue is no longer salient. To the contrary, the available evidence
suggests that White House and OMB review, in the aggregate, further
293
favors industry.
And there are countless other areas of administration where the
influence of concentrated wealth has systematically checked and
prodded the internal bureaucracy, without effective checks or inputs
from the countervailing organization or the vast majority of Ameri294
cans.
Environmental regulation and trade policy are two other
295
striking examples.
Certainly, unilateral executive action does not always favor business interests. As the above discussion demonstrates, the checks and
prods imposed by wealthy individuals and organizations are weaker
when issues are highly salient and countervailing organizations act in
296
opposition.
Furthermore, agencies do not typically neglect their
missions altogether even when they are pushed by business interests
297
or adjust course in response to those interests. But while the effect
of wealth on internal administrative checks is neither simple nor linear, it is systematic.
IV. ORGANIZED WEALTH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE
Thus far, the project of this Article has been largely descriptive
and critical: wealth systematically checks the branches and the par293

294

295

296
297

For example, recent studies of OMB identify a distinct anti-environmental bent that is
consistent across administrations. See Wagner, supra note 211, at 151 n.166 (summarizing
OMB studies from the Bush I and Clinton Administrations that analyzed the impact of
regulation on industry).
For another example involving the financial sector, see Tara Siegel Bernard, Brokers Fight
Rule to Favor Best Interests of Customers, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2014, at B1, B7 (“Amid fierce
pushback from the financial services industry, the Labor Department, which oversees retirement plans, recently delayed releasing a revised proposal that would require a broader
group of professionals to put their clients’ interest ahead of their own when dealing with
retirement accounts.”).
See, e.g., Robert E. Baldwin & Christopher S. Magee, Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional
Voting on Recent Trade Bills (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6376,
1998), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6376.pdf (finding that business influence affected
legislators’ votes on NAFTA and GATT); Michael E. Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki, Analyzing the Role of Business in Environmental Policy, in BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
CORPORATE INTERESTS IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 3–4 (Michael E. Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki eds., 2007).
See supra notes 142, 158–59, 280–82 and accompanying text.
See Carpenter & Moss, supra note 166, at 12 (arguing that even when regulatory capture
exists, it is limited).

Dec. 2015]

SEPARATIONS OF WEALTH

481

ties in ways that complicate a partisanship focused account. This Part
shifts to a normative analysis. It asks how the dominance of wealth
advances or impedes attainment of the functional goals of the separation of powers—as understood by contemporary scholars—and concludes that democratic accountability is severely injured. It then considers what should be done in response.
A. Functions of Constitutional Structure
Legal scholars and judges—at least those who embrace a functional, rather than formal, approach to the separation of powers—
focus on several overarching goals of our separation of powers. These include preserving liberty, promoting governmental efficacy, and
enhancing democratic accountability, all through diffusing political
298
power.
Scholars focusing on partisanship and internal checks em299
brace these goals as well. Given the limitations of inter-branch political competition in practice, they argue, political parties and internal executive branch checks provide an alternate way to achieve or
300
undermine these functional goals. But how does wealth shape the
ability of the branches, parties, and internal checks to achieve these
goals?
1. Liberty
In the conventional telling, liberty is a central aim of the separation of powers. By dividing functions among the three branches and
enabling the various branches to check one another, the theory runs,
the Framers sought to reduce “the amount of damage to liberty or
other interests that any fallible or corrupt official might be able to in301
flict.”
According to some commentators, hyper-polarization and
298

299

300
301

See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 640 (2000)
(describing goals as protecting fundamental rights, advancing democracy, and enhancing
professional competence); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J.
1725, 1729–30 (1996) (describing separation of powers goals as balance, accountability,
and energetic, efficient government); Magill, supra note 131, at 1148–52, 1148 n.80
(2000) (arguing that formalists and functionalists agree on an intermediate goal of separation of powers: to prevent a single branch of government from possessing and using
too much power). Historical accounts of the founding are largely in accord. See, e.g.,
GWYN, supra note 73, at 127–28.
See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 10, at 428 (describing the ultimate goal of separation of powers as dispersing federal power across three branches to prohibit tyranny while creating
an effective and accountable National government).
See supra notes 9–11; see also infra notes 304, 308, 314–15 and accompanying text.
Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice? 54 B.C.L. REV. 433, 440
(2013). The notion is that, because branches independent of Congress would ultimately
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the related growth of the executive branch at the expense of Con302
gress threatens this promise. On this account, the over-empowered
Executive directs vast domestic and national security programs, and is
virtually unchecked even when government actions threaten individual liberty interests.
For such critics of executive power, the political economy
sketched above could assuage concerns, at least insofar as the particular executive actions in question implicate market and business interests. As discussed in Part III.A, even during periods of unified government when the partisanship theory predicts legislative and
executive collusion, wealth, particularly business organizations, functions to moderate and limit government action. Indeed, when there
are opposing interests within the business community, as is often the
case, potential government intrusions on liberty interests decrease
further; it becomes difficult for any one particular interest group
within the category of wealthy interests to propel government action
past multiple veto gates. And in times of divided government, when
the executive may attempt to push the boundaries of formal power,
wealth often has sufficient influence throughout the bureaucracy and
the White House to provide a check where one otherwise may be
303
lacking.
Yet in other important ways, money in governance operates at
cross-purposes with liberty goals: Wealth can overwhelm internal executive branch mechanisms designed to protect individual fairness
and due process. For example, within agencies, the separation of adjudication from legislative, investigatory, and enforcement activities
aims to promote due process, while the civil service is designed to depoliticize governmental administration in order to ensure regularity
304
and the rule of law. Wealth’s systematic influence over these inter305
nal mechanisms weakens their ability to deliver on that promise.
Perhaps more importantly, the notion that minimizing government
action necessarily promotes liberty, particularly in the economic

302
303
304
305

apply the law, legislators would have strong incentives to define punishable misconduct
with precision and moderation, thereby benefiting all citizens, whether friends of Congress or not. AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 63 (2005). See also
Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1515–16,
1530–31 (1991) (arguing that the primary separation of powers goal is to protect individual rights against encroachment by a tyrannical majority).
E.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 15–16; SHANE, supra note 221, at vii. Cf. Levinson &
Pildes, supra note 9, at 2350, 2354–55.
See supra Part III.C.
Metzger, supra note 10, at 429–30.
See supra Part III.C.
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sphere, rests on a Lochnerian vision of individual freedom. Should
one reject that view, recognizing that government inaction often allows for private invasions of liberty interests or, more fundamentally,
that market ordering is itself a legal construct, the argument for organized wealth’s political checks would further weaken.
2. Efficacy
While the separation of powers is often thought of as a way to
check government action, the division of governmental functions can
also serve to promote effective government. Indeed, scholars have
argued that our constitutional structure is aimed not only at checking
government action, but also at establishing productive and energetic
government, a break from the national experience under the Articles
307
of Confederation.
The idea is that by engendering competition
among and between the branches, government actors can be stirred
308
to act. And by enabling each branch to concentrate on a different
309
Our constitutional structure thus
function, expertise can flourish.
seeks to facilitate necessary action and to increase the efficacy of gov310
ernment.
A common refrain in the literature and commentary on constitutional dysfunction is that hyper-polarization has impeded governmental energy and efficacy. Because of partisan divides, the branches do
311
not stir one another to act, but rather remain locked in opposition.
According to more recent work, the problem is not just polarization
but fragmentation. Because contemporary parties are fragmented
and decentralized, the parties’ formal leaders, who should have the
312
most incentive to compromise, struggle to control other members.
To these critics of contemporary political partisanship, there is a
positive story to tell about the effects of wealth on Congress.

306

307

308
309
310
311
312

See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For one such critique of Lochner and its reliance on common law baselines, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 873, 875 (1987).
See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (noting that by “allocating specific
powers and responsibilities to a branch fitted to the task,” the Framers created a national
government that is “effective”). AMAR, supra note 301, at 64; ARENDT, supra note 36, at
152–55 (discussing Montesquieu and Founders’ incorporation of his theories).
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2312; Waldron, supra note 301, at 440.
AMAR, supra note 301, at 64.
See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 24, at 366–67 (emphasizing the capacity of divided authorities to push each other to action when changing social conditions require it).
See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 2, at 330–31.
See Pildes, supra note 2, at 333 (explaining that the extreme polarization of political parties has damaging, and seemingly irreversible consequences).
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Through the mechanisms discussed in Parts I and II, wealth mitigates
polarization on important issues. Wealth exerts substantial influence
over both parties, ensuring that key segments of each support their
positions. Thus, in practice, compromises are often more likely to be
reached when government action is essential for business interests.
Whether this phenomenon is something to celebrate, however, is
contestable. The answer depends in large part on one’s policy perspective and estimation of the compromises reached. Moreover, government action produced by wealth’s influence over both parties may
be in tension with the third functional goal of separation of powers:
democratic accountability. That is, such action may not be reflective
of majority viewpoints, and may sometimes be more aptly described
313
as capture than compromise.
Finally, and most important, just as wealth can help narrow the
gap between the political parties in order to promote governmental
action, wealth also prevents action where legislators across partisan
divides might otherwise agree. As Part III.B discussed, business interests often have particular ability to affect gridlock: Campaign donations, lobbying, personal connections, the revolving door, expertise
over technical issues, and other mechanisms enable wealth to exercise influence over various veto points in the legislative process, and
thereby to block incipient action. And business interests have particular incentive to affect gridlock: They are able to exercise significant
control over the market conditions in which law attempts to intervene, making legislative change less appealing.
Within the executive branch, a similarly mixed picture of the relationship between wealth and governmental efficacy emerges. Scholars who study the administrative state often emphasize its ability to
produce energetic and effective government: In an era of polarization and gridlock, when the inter-branch system fails, executive
314
branch agencies continue to innovate and govern.
According to
these scholars, internal separations and checks encourage interagency competition and the development of expertise, both of which
315
enhance governmental productivity.

313
314
315

See supra Part III.C (discussing role of organized wealth in regulatory and administrative
process).
See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 48, at 260; Freeman & Spence, supra note 48, at 7; Kagan,
supra note 53, at 2344.
See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1150–51 (2012) (discussing benefits and drawbacks of inter-agency
coordination); Metzger, supra note 10, at 425 (analyzing what types of administrative
structures are likely to prove effective at checking executive power).
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Checks and prods by wealthy interests sometimes enhance this
dynamic. Business groups can be instrumental in pushing agencies
to innovate. They also can provide important information throughout the regulatory process, enhancing expertise. On the other hand,
316
organized wealth is just as likely, if not more so, to stall regulation.
Indeed, even when one part of an agency innovates through new
regulatory or enforcement tools, business groups often find ways to
check the putative policies before they are enacted or to challenge
317
them once implemented.
3. Democratic Accountability
The third function attributed to our constitutional structure by
both the Court and contemporary theorists is that of furthering dem318
ocratic accountability.
According to numerous scholars, the
Founders sought to create a government influenced by, and in service
of, the citizenry generally—as opposed to a regime by and for “the
319
cabals of a few.” Separating powers across branches was one way to
achieve this goal. By establishing multiple centers of recourse, many
places to which citizens can appeal when they are not receiving satisfaction from other centers of government, government becomes
more responsive and accountable, while still respecting liberty inter320
ests. Because each government entity is selected in a different way
by a different constituency, government policy, the theory runs, is
321
And
more likely to reflect multiple indices of popular sentiment.
while a faction might be able to capture one branch, it is less likely to
322
acquire power over all three.
Scholars who focus on alternate mechanisms of political competition emphasize democratic accountability as well. For example, internal separation-of-powers scholars contend that the separation of
functions within agencies and the presence of multiple loci of appeal

316
317
318

319
320
321
322

See supra Part III.B & notes 284–95 and accompanying text.
See notes 284–95, 345–47 and accompanying text.
See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (emphasizing accountability, along
with efficacy, as a separation-of-powers goal). For descriptions of accountability as a core
separation of powers value, see Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 42–45 (1995) and Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 220, at
94.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 60, at 82.
See AMAR, supra note 301, at 64 (discussing how separation of powers has allowed each
branch to become specialized).
Id.
Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 434–36 (1987).
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within the administrative state help preserve the accountability of the
323
bureaucracy, while making capture more difficult.
It is not inconceivable that the political economy described above
could be construed as consistent with a vision of democratically accountable government. Indeed, the current majority of the Court
has so argued. According to Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for
the majority in McCutcheon v. FEC, removing limits on campaign contributions allows those persons (natural or otherwise) who care the
most about issues to organize effectively and make their views
324
heard.
On this view, systematic checks and prods by wealthy individuals and business organizations help conform government action
to the views of those who care enough to get involved.
On the other hand—and I think this is the correct view—wealth’s
disproportionate influence at every step of the political and governing process and the lack of effective countervailing participation
mean that government leaders often fail to consider, and government
action often fails to reflect, the views and interests of the vast majority
of Americans. Instead, government hears from and responds to the
interests of a particular faction. As a result, the democratic accountability promised by inter-branch competition, as well as by alternative
mechanisms of political competition, is missing. And one need not
settle on a single theory of democratic accountability to conclude that
325
capture by faction is inconsistent with the ideal.
At the most fundamental level, our constitutional structure aims
to preserve republican government and protect the citizens from the
emergence of tyranny “by establishing multiple heads of authority in
government, which are then pitted one against another in a continu326
ous struggle.” As James Madison wrote long ago, “It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the society against the
327
injustice of the other part.” As the preceding section demonstrates,
323

324

325

326
327

See Metzger, supra note 10, at 457 (concluding that maintaining executive branch accountability through congressional enactments reinforces the importance of separation
of powers in “the contemporary world of administrative governance”).
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014). But see id. at 1462 (“Representatives are not to follow constituent orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns.
Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected officials.”).
For one theory of representation, see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION 144–45 (1967) (highlighting that a delegate “must do what his principal
would do, must act as if the principal himself were acting . . . must vote as a majority of his
constituents would”).
Strauss, supra note 13, at 578.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 60, at 323.
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because of the pervasive influence of wealth across branches and parties, power is far less diffused than constitutional theory promises.
The multiple heads of authority in government and in politics do not
consistently perform the checking and prodding function anticipated, or at least do not do so in ways reflective of and accountable to
the citizenry generally.
B. Reforming Constitutional Law
Wealth corrodes constitutional structure, leaving us with a government in which power is frequently not diffused and democratic
responsiveness is undermined. What should be done? This section
first considers the possibility of using greater judicial review of executive and legislative action to check the role of wealth. It ultimately
concludes, however, that institutional design reform—namely reform
aimed at building countervailing organization, as well as more familiar election law and lobbying reform—is more promising than an expanded role for the judiciary. Finally, it responds to critics who
would argue that such reform is wholly impossible given the political
economy described in this article.
1. Enhanced Judicial Review
One possible response to the power of wealth in politics and governance would be something akin to the tiered judicial scrutiny of
executive action established by Justice Robert Jackson’s famous con328
currence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer. Or, more familiarly, the heightened scrutiny defended in United States v. Carolene
329
Products’ famous footnote four. Courts could impose more intense
judicial review of legislative or executive action in circumstances
where wealth has dominated without countervailing checks. For example, courts might impose greater scrutiny when wealthy interests
have participated at disproportionate rates in the administrative process, or where a particular governmental action serves to further concentrate power among the wealthy. Conversely, where the executive
acts to remediate the concentration of wealth or where the government effectively involves countervailing organizations in the governance process, more deference would be due.
328

329

343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at
2353–54 (arguing for more intense judicial review of executive action, particularly in the
national security context, to redress the absence of partisan checks during unified government).
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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Indeed, courts, for a time, sought to redress imbalances in interest
group power in the context of administrative law cases. Beginning in
the late 1960s, judges on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia made a concerted effort to consider the role of concentrated
330
power in administrative law cases. In the view of these judges, the
costs and dynamics of political organization meant that industry and
other business interests were overrepresented. As a result, environmental, consumer, and other interests were due special solicitude.
The judges thus fashioned new procedural rules that required agencies to offer more procedures than the Administrative Procedure Act
331
(“APA”) mandated. The D.C. Circuit essentially attempted a power
diffusing project, in which the judicial role was heightened when
332
countervailing checks were absent.
The Supreme Court unanimously put an end to this approach in
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
333
Inc. Holding that hybrid procedural requirements had no basis in
the APA, the Court emphasized that in reviewing agency rules, judges
should “not stray beyond the judicial province to explore the procedural format or to impose upon the agency its own notion of which
procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some vague, undefined
334
public good.”
Outside of the APA context, however, judicially imposed heightened scrutiny is not foreclosed, for Vermont Yankee was an interpretation of the APA, not a general rejection of the use of judicial pre330

331

332
333
334

See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829 , reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 988 (1977) (“[W]e are particularly concerned that the final shaping of the rules we are reviewing here may have been by compromise among contending industry forces, rather than by exercise of the independent discretion in the public interest the Communications Act vests in individual commissioners.”); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The ultimate test of industry structure in the communications common carrier field must be the public interest,
not the private financial interests of those who have until now enjoyed the fruits of a de
facto monopoly.”).
For analysis of these developments, see Merrill, supra note 33, at 1050–52; Antonin Scalia,
Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345,
348--56 (1978); Stewart, supra note 151, at 1711–60; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 394 (2015)
Bruce Ackerman has referred to this as a democracy-enhancing project. See Bruce
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985).
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
Id. at 549 (1978); see also id. at 524 (“[T]he [APA] established the maximum procedural
requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in
conducting rulemaking procedures. . . . [R]eviewing courts are generally not free to impose [additional procedural requirements].”); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97–98 (1983) (warning against overly stringent arbitrariness of judicial review).
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sumptions to counter-balance powerful interest groups. Indeed, in
the 1980s, drawing on public choice theory, numerous scholars urged
variations of this approach, albeit not from a separation-of-powers
335
perspective. For example, courts could apply less scrutiny to executive orders or regulations designed to redress economic inequality or
to protect the environment. The theory would be that those are the
kinds of policies unable to pass Congress even in unified government
due to the aggregation of power in the hands of wealthy individuals
and business organizations. Conversely, when an executive order
benefits a narrow and well-funded interest, and there are no countervailing checks, courts could follow Justice Jackson in tilting toward rejection of executive action, particularly when that action amounts to a
novel expansion of executive power.
Such an approach finds support in existing case law. Following
Vermont Yankee, lower courts have continued to worry about agency
336
capture, and those concerns have influenced their decisionmaking.
335

336

Numerous scholars have used public choice theory to argue for heightened judicial review in the constitutional context. See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE
SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 2, 17–25, 31–39 (1966) (arguing that, at least in
the First Amendment area, the Court should not defer to a political process driven by interest group politics but rather should advance the cause of the groups the political process underrepresents); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 46–47, 78, 80–81 (1989) (arguing that the
susceptibility of the politically accountable branches to interest group pressure undermines the case for deferential constitutional review); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 705–17 (1984) (advocating farreaching substantive judicial review under the Takings and Contract Clauses to curb rent
seeking); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54
TUL. L. REV. 849, 875 (1980) (using interest group theory to support his argument that
the Supreme Court should invalidate some “private-regarding” legislation); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 52, 85–86 (supporting use of more rigorous constitutional scrutiny to invalidate legislation that rewards the raw political power of interest groups). Scholars have
also argued that judges should employ the tools of statutory interpretation to render interest group capture more difficult or less effective. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L.
REV. 275, 279, 298–99, 303–09, 324–25 (1988) (arguing for narrowly interpreting statutes
when the benefits are concentrated and the costs distributed, and broadly interpreting
statutes when the benefits are distributed and the costs are concentrated); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 471, 486 (1989)
(advocating narrowly construing statutes that represent interest group transfers). For
discussion of the literature, see Elhauge, supra note 151, at 32.
See, e.g., Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483, 499 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing the risk of
agency capture as a justification for holding that a state enforcement action against solid
waste facility did not trigger statutory bar against a subsequent citizen suit); Am. Horse
Prot. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that an agency’s correspondence with representatives of the regulated industry casts doubt on the agency’s interpretation of available data and suggested that the agency’s refusal to act was not the
product of reasoned decision-making); Litton Systems, Inc. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785, 809 n.
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For example, courts have observed, that, in light of the problem of
agency capture and the outsized role of industry in rulemaking process, “if there are policy reasons to exempt federal agencies
from . . . suits, it is up to Congress to assess them and to determine
whether the scope of its sovereign immunity waiver should be revisit337
ed.” Other courts have fashioned rules, not found in the text of the
APA, to guard against ex parte contacts with powerful interest
338
groups. Courts could do still more to impose heightened review in
339
To that end, legal scholars, in recent work,
similar circumstances.
have sought to reinvigorate arguments for heightened judicial scrutiny of laws that discriminate on the basis of wealth or that reflect the
340
political powerlessness of the poor.

337

338

339

340

36 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the “sham exception” to the rule that joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate antitrust laws is applicable in situations of agency
capture); Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 911 F. Supp. 2d 739, 753–54 (N.D.
Ill. 2012) (citing the risk of agency capture to support a public nuisance claim against a
federal agency). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1041 (1997) (observing that “most of the innovations [expanding
the authority of courts at the expense of agencies] spawned during the 1967–1983 period
have endured”).
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 754. Some scholars have called for a Vermont Yankee II, urging the Supreme Court to rein in perceived undue lower-court interference with agency discretion and autonomy. See Jack Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 860 (2007) (urging the Court to
repudiate a host of court-made rules not found in the text of the APA, including the rule
prohibiting agency ex parte contacts and prejudgment in rulemakings to the expanded
modern conception of the notice of proposed rulemaking); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting
for Vermont Yankee II, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 669, 670 (2005) (calling for a Vermont Yankee II
to end the First Circuit’s then presumption that language in organic statutes calling for a
“hearing” in agency adjudications triggers the APA’s formal, trial-type adjudicatory procedures); Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418, 418 (1981) (calling for a Vermont Yankee II to put an end to
rigorous substantive judicial review of agency policy decisions). To date, the Court has
made only minor interventions. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 331, at 394.
See e.g., Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 51–58. In the years since Vermont Yankee, the D.C.
Circuit has effectively limited the prohibition on ex parte contacts to informal rulemakings that resolve conflicting claims among identifiable claimants rather than establish
general policy. See Iowa State Commerce Comm’n v. Office of the Fed. Inspector of the
Alaska Natural Gas Transp. Sys., 730 F.2d 1566, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Sierra Club v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401–02 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing whether the court intended
Home Box Office to apply to all informal rulemaking procedures).
Cf. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Rational Basis With Economic Bite, 8 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 1055 (2014) (arguing for “rational basis with bite” when licensing laws,
brought about by interest group lobbying, restrict entry into a field of economic activity).
See Ross & Li, supra note 7; see generally Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527 (2015) (defining political powerlessness and arguing that the poor
are powerless at the federal and state levels).
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2. Problems with Heightened Judicial Review
Greater judicial scrutiny is appealing for anyone concerned about
wealth’s role in governance. Yet, ultimately there are reasons to be
wary of relying on the judiciary to reduce the checks and prods im341
posed by wealth. For one, while substantial evidence demonstrates
the dominance of wealthy interests in governance overall, it is much
harder to determine whether wealthy individuals and businesses have
dominated in a single case. Likewise, while there is little doubt that
governmental policy overall has contributed to rising inequality, it is
not always easy to determine if a particular regulation or statutory
provision would further concentrate economic and political power.
More importantly, courts may not be particularly effective at making these determinations. Under the adversarial system, courts generally consider only the arguments of the actual litigants. Individuals
or organizations interested in the future implications of a case, but
not in the judgment itself, generally lack standing and receive inade342
quate consideration.
Courts also are often not presented with the
full array of arguments. And because they focus on the particular
parties and adjudicated historical facts before them, courts tend to
underweigh, or be underinformed about, the systemic context and
343
consequences of their decisions.
Furthermore, even if courts could determine whether the influence of concentrated wealth had resulted in an absence of political
checks in a particular instance, or whether a particular policy was
likely to further concentrate power with wealth, more intrusive judi344
cial review might not actually redress the problem. Litigation, like
341

342
343
344

For an excellent elaboration of the problems associated with enhanced judicial review to
combat interest group power, see Elhauge, supra note 151. See also NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 98–150 (1994) (making the case for comparative institutional analysis between
politics, the market, and courts, and explaining that the groups that are over-represented
or under-represented in the political process may also be over-represented or underrepresented, as the case may be, in the courts and in the economic marketplace). For a
qualified response, see Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism
After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 229–30 (1997) (arguing that judicial policymaking may be less susceptible to interest group distortions—but only within a narrow range
of controversies where each of the contending positions is represented by a group with
significant (but not necessarily equal) organization strength, and only when the outcomes reached in these circumstances will not be trumped by a legislated solution).
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–67 (1992) (holding that the
prediction of future harm is insufficient to obtain standing).
Elhauge, supra note 151, at 77.
Elhauge argues that “any defects in the political process identified by interest group theory depend on implicit normative baselines and thus do not stand independent of substan-
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legislation and regulation, is susceptible to wealthy interest group
pressures. Litigation is expensive. Well-financed groups are able to
litigate more frequently, to influence more effectively the information tribunals receive, and to strategically settle cases that may
produce unfavorable precedents. These methods do not require that
judges sympathize with any particular view. Rather, they depend on
345
parties’ differential abilities to litigate and settle.
Finally, there is also the separate concern that at least some portion of judges might be predisposed to favor wealth. Wealthy interest
groups influence judicial appointments and are more likely to do so
346
if judges serve as more general regulators.
And judges, perhaps
347
even more so than elected officials, are drawn from the elite.
Though Article III judges are not subject to the same capture and
corruption mechanisms at work in the political branches, they too are
likely to bring their own beliefs and experiences to bear on decisions
348
they make. As with other proposals that would change judicial review to make it less deferential to political outcomes, greater scrutiny
of laws here would expand the lawmaking power of the judiciary.
In short, increased judicial review could perversely augment the
influence of wealth, further limiting checks on its power. And indeed, business interests have had remarkable success, of late—in cases involving labor rights, health and safety, and consumer protection—in convincing judges on the D.C. Circuit and elsewhere to
protect wealth from national regulatory intrusion, even if it means
349
developing new doctrine to do so.

345
346
347

348

349

tive conclusions about the merits of particular political outcomes.” Id. at 34. This is a valid point; however, this Article answers it by offering a baseline norm of a more equal distribution of political power on the axis of wealth.
See id. at 80. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
Elhauge, supra note 151, at 80–81; Nancy Scherer, et al., Sounding the Fire Alarm: The Role
of Interest Groups in the Lower Federal Court Confirmation Process, 70 J. POL. 1026, 1026 (2008).
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST:
FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT
ADMINISTRATION 60 (1995) (“Federal judges are already drawn from the ranks of educated political elites.”).
See id. See generally Nicole E. Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the Limits of
Perception, 47 AKRON L. REV. 693 (2014) (discussing the effects of a judge’s prior assumptions, values, and experiences on judicial decisionmaking). Cf. MCCARTY ET AL., supra
note 93, at 55, 76 (explaining the role biases play in interest group votes).
See e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking down SEC
regulation mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, which was designed to require disclosure of the origin of “conflict minerals”); R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking
down, under commercial speech doctrine, a rule requiring disclosure on cigarette packages); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (striking down NLRB
rule that compelled employers to post a notice that recounts employee rights under exist-
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C. Democratic Institutional Design and the Law of Organization
1. From Moderation and Insulation to Participation and Organization
Though lawyers often look to courts to solve problems, judgemade doctrine can only do so much to diffuse political power. Given
the limits of judicial intervention, institutional design may well be a
more promising avenue for addressing the dominance of wealth in
governance. Existing reform proposals in the constitutional structure
literature are, not surprisingly, inadequate to the task. They typically
focus on moderating the power of the partisan Executive and on in350
sulating the bureaucracy from partisanship. Such proposals would
do little to diffuse power lodged with wealth. Even if the President’s
power were reduced, wealthy groups and individuals would continue
to have unmatched resources to participate disproportionately in
agency meetings and comments, to provide regulators access to vital
information, and to appeal to different governmental actors regarding the interpretation of law and regulation. Indeed, it is telling that
some independent agencies, structurally insulated from the full extent of presidential power, have suffered capture by organized busi351
ness interests no less than executive agencies. Similarly, proposals
to amend legal rules and institutions to make political parties more
ideologically “moderate,” or to strengthen the powers of the minority
political party, may be helpful for other reasons, but would be unlikely to diffuse the power of wealth. Indeed, some such proposals are
352
likely to create additional veto points for wealth to exploit.

350

351
352

ing law and invoking aggressive interpretation of the commercial speech doctrine, as well
as agency’s statutory authority, to do so).
See, e.g., Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2376–78 (“[C]onstiutional engineering might
focus on insulating the administrative bureaucracy more fully from the partisan pressures
of unified government.”); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of
Executive Control Over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1826 (2010) (“[T]hough complete insulation from political control may be unattainable . . . the structure of an independent agency at least enables tensions between political actors to keep politically motivated decisionmaking at bay.”).
See Barkow, supra note 153, at 65–66 (using example of Consumer Products Safety Commission to show how a structurally independent agency can be captured).
For example, some scholars and elected officials have urged the use of open primaries to
generate more moderate nominees and give voters more centrist choices on general election day. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, 2380–81; Charles Schumer, End Partisan Primaries, Save America, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2014, at A21. But see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard
H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643
(1998) (arguing that “artificial” barriers to robust partisan competition not be permitted). Another set of proposals is to empower the party out of control to offer criticisms
and alternatives to the policies of the party in power and to engage in auditing, investigation, and information-gathering during times of unified government. E.g., Fontana, supra
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One obvious place to turn, then, is to proposals to reform campaign finance law, to increase voting rights of less affluent Americans,
353
often disenfranchised in practice if not by rule, and to increase
354
transparency in politics and government.
These proposals are important and, depending on their form, could help reduce the domi355
nance of both affluent individuals and business entities in politics.
At the same time, these proposals have commanded an undue
356
amount of scholarly attention given their inherent limits.
Reform
efforts focused on restricting the flow of money—i.e., on insulating
government actors from money’s influence—face significant, perhaps
even insurmountable, practical hurdles: Money finds new channels
357
when regulators shut down one avenue.
Without additional re-

353

354
355

356

357

note 49, at 602 (arguing that “government in opposition” rules are necessary to ensure
that political minorities have a voice in the democratic process). Scholars urging such reforms also view favorably the Senate filibuster, which empowers the minority in periods of
unified government.
Daniel Weeks, Why Are the Poor and Minorities Less Likely to Vote?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 10,
2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/why-are-the-poor-andminorities-less-likely-to-vote/282896/.
For example, the Sunlight Foundation urges reforms to make government more accountable and transparent. See http://sunlightfoundation.com/.
The separation-of-powers arguments raised in this Article could potentially provide further normative support for the effort to resist the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence
striking down campaign finance regulations. The basic outline of such an approach
should be evident from the preceding Parts. In brief: Political competition and the diffusion of political power throughout the polity are independent constitutional values,
worthy of protection. Yet the dominance of wealth in politics, combined with rising
wealth inequality, degrades political competition in government and concentrates power
in too few hands. Unregulated money and laws that burden voting rights of less affluent
Americans thus stand in tension with the goals of separated powers. Such an approach is,
however, entirely unlikely to prevail in the current Court, and is of limited practical
promise, as discussed below.
Campaign finance, voting, and lobbying law have received and continue to receive extensive scholarly attention. On campaign finance, see, for example, LESSIG, supra note 6;
POST, supra note 6. On voting, see Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991) (using the Voting Rights Act to conceptualize the
nature of minority voting exclusion); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is
Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1996) (arguing for race conscious districting). On lobbying, see supra note 102.
See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999) (arguing that money finds new channels when existing routes
are closed off); Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 41
(2012) (detailing recent Court decisions and describing a “reverse hydraulics” whereby
the Court rolled back campaign finance law as it stood for decades and “political money
has rushed back to newly deregulated channels like water finding its own level”). In recent years, election law scholars have increasingly turned their attention to lobbying law.
E.g., Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13
ELECTION L. J. 160 (2014); Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign
Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying Rent Seeking, and the
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forms, simply capping campaign contributions is unlikely to have
much effect. Meanwhile, disclosure and transparency regimes have
been only minimally effective at identifying the most influential players in politics, while doing little to counter-balance wealth’s influ358
ence. And efforts to protect the right to vote at the individual level
are unlikely, alone, to redress the significant imbalances in participation and power detailed in this Article: Participation through voting
is only one small way in which citizens participate in politics and gov359
ernance.
The separation-of-powers frame advanced in this Article helps illuminate a complementary path for reform, and one that has received far less attention. If the goal of the Madisonian system is for
ambition to counter ambition, law reform should focus on facilitating
the participation of countervailing organizations in government, as
well as moderating the role of money in campaigns, increasing transparency, and protecting individual voting rights. Reforms aimed at
involving groups of citizens in political decisionmaking would work to
check and balance power so that one faction does not dominate.
This basic approach has a long tradition and many variations. While
Madison envisioned the three branches of government countering
one another’s ambition, other systems have allocated power across
informal political substructures, like parties, unions, and social
360
groups, in order to promote democratic decisionmaking.
From this perspective, some existing good-government reforms
appear not only unsuccessful but also counter-productive. Certain
361
strategies, while unable in practice to reduce the flow of money,
have actually undermined organized, popularly rooted mobiliza-

358

359
360

361

Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2011); Zephyr Teachout, The Forgotten Law of Lobbying,
13 ELECTION L. J. 4 (2014).
See, e.g., Jennifer A. Heerwig & Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and
Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 GEO. L.J. 1443 (2014) (finding that compliance
with existing disclosure regulations is inconsistent and that the current regime fails to
identify the most potentially influential players in the campaign finance system).
See supra Part II (detailing mechanisms of participation by wealthy citizens and organizations).
LIJPHART, supra note 75, at 9, 25 (contrasting separation-of-powers approaches to other
constitutional power-sharing systems); see also AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY:
GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 181 (1999) (discussing
corporatist systems in which interests groups are incorporated into the process of policy
formation). Cf. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 84–85 (1997) (discussing obstacles to and problems with use of corporatist
structures in the United States).
See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 357; Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124
HARV. L. REV. 118, 120, 125 (2010).
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362

tion. Limits on coordination, for example, have reduced the ability
of popular organizations to join together with political parties and
candidates. Other regulations have weakened political party efforts
363
to mobilize new voters. As a group, these well-intentioned laws have
364
Meanwhile,
made it harder to draw ordinary people into politics.
they have done little to counteract the influence wielded by business
organizations in lobbying Congress, participating in the regulatory
process, and exploiting the revolving door and other mechanisms of
influence.
Scholars in election law are increasingly moving away from insulation—or efforts to “level down” campaign spending—and toward
“leveling up” reforms aimed at bringing countervailing voices into
public debates. Bruce Cain has supported “the Madisonian principle
365
of opposing faction with faction.”
He writes that “another way to
neutralize political advantage aside from capping and prohibiting is
366
to support countervailing voices.” The mechanism he favors, along
with other campaign finance scholars and good governance groups,
is public financing. Others extend this argument to the lobbying
context, arguing that we should find ways to level up by publicly fi367
nancing lobbyists and making them available to congressional staff.
In the administrative law field, scholars make similar leveling-up
arguments. Wendy Wagner argues that institutional design reform
should focus on making participation by a diverse range of participants easier, for example by lowering the cost of information and ac368
cess. She urges reforms that would make access and information

362
363
364
365

366
367
368

SKOCPOL, supra note 5, at 281.
Robert F. Bauer, The Right to “Do Politics” and Not Just to Speak: Thinking About the Constitutional Protections for Political Action, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 67 (2013).
SKOCPOL, supra note 5, at 281.
Bruce E. Cain, More or Less: Searching for Regulatory Balance, in RACE, REFORM, AND
REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
263, 277 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles et al., eds., 2011). For a discussion of this shift, see Sachs,
supra note 26.
Cain, supra note 365, at 277.
E.g., Gerken, supra note 357, at 1165–67 (offering several ways for Congress to level up
through increasing its own capacity).
Wendy Wagner, The Participation-Centered Model Meets Administrative Process, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 671, 677, 692 (2013) (“In administrative law, agency bureaucrats and appointees are
held accountable through a pluralistic system of oversight whereby the affected parties
are invited to comment and then have an opportunity to seek judicial review of agency
rules that stray outside the authorization of the statute or are arbitrary with respect to the
agency’s underlying choices. In order to make this administrative law work, however, the
full range of affected groups must participate throughout the process without allowing
one set of interests to dominate the process and capture the agency.”).
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throughout the regulatory process less costly. Nina Mendelson has
similarly focused on expanding public participation, urging agencies
370
to take large volumes of comments more seriously.
Such proposals to increase participation through public financing, decreasing costs of access, and taking existing mass petitions
more seriously are all promising from a separation-of-powers vantage
point—they seek to enhance political contestation and provide miss371
ing checks on wealthy interests. Still, these proposals do little to redress the underlying imbalance in organization—an imbalance fundamental to the problem identified in this Article.
Legal interventions designed to facilitate organization are a necessary complement. Indeed, they may even have an important ad372
vantage over laws focusing only on individual access.
Reforms
aimed at increasing organizational capacity enable under-represented
citizens to check and prod as do their wealthier counterparts—to exercise organized political power throughout the processes of politics
and government. Organizations permit individuals with low per capi373
ta resources to pool resources and speak with a stronger voice. As
Benjamin Sachs writes, “a well-organized political group can mobilize
voters and influence elections; it can lobby and influence legislation;
374
it can buy media time and influence public opinion.”
Well369

370
371

372
373

374

As Wagner notes, while the costs of commenting on a noticed rule is superficially low,
there are multiple points of entry beyond notice and comment. Id. at 686–87. The period before Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the process of OIRA review, for example,
are less transparent and more costly to access, providing significant opportunities for imbalances in influence. Id. at 688–89.
Nina Mendelson, Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1343, 1380 (2011).
Skeptics of Mendelson’s argument express concern that mass comments are groupfacilitated and that signatories might be signing because of group rhetoric. Mendelson
correctly retorts that excluding rulemaking comments because groups are involved or
rhetoric is used would leave very few comments, but the problem is deeper than that:
group participation should be encouraged and facilitated, not feared. Id. at 1372–73.
Benjamin Sachs has made this point in arguing for labor law reform. Sachs, supra note
26, at 171–75.
See Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance, 20 POL.
& SOC’Y 393, 424 (1992); see also 1 JOSHUA COHEN & JOEL ROGERS, ASSOCIATIONS AND
DEMOCRACY: THE REAL UTOPIAS PROJECT 126–27 (Erik Olin Wright, ed. 1985) (discussing
how associative democracy based on non-governmental social groups could mitigate inequality, assist underrepresented interest groups, and protect individual liberties); JOHN D.
STEPHENS, THE TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM 49–50 (Michael Mann ed.,
1979) (discussing the importance of labor unions and other organizations in strengthening the welfare state and facilitating movement from capitalism to socialism); David Bradley et al., Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies, 55 WORLD POL. 193,
197 (2003) (“Organization in unions results in a shift of power in the market toward the
union members.”).
Sachs, supra note 26, at 167.
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organized groups can also help shape regulatory agendas, comment
on proposed rules, press for agency enforcement activity and so on.
And to the extent such organizations are membership groups, rather
than professionally managed “check-book” organizations, their participation helps facilitate more representative and diffuse political involvement. Organizations funded by and directed by a range of
Americans, representing their interests, can provide checks and
prods now often missing.
An organization-focused approach is supported by both historical
and empirical evidence. Historians have illuminated the instrumental role played by mass membership organizations in the passage of
wage and hour laws, labor legislation, progressive taxes, and civil
rights legislation, even in the face of staunch opposition from
375
wealth.
More recent empirical work also supports the conclusion
that organization is essential to our basic system of fighting faction
376
with faction. Martin Gilens, for example, finds an exception to the
general rule that policy makers are far more responsive to the interests and preferences of the wealthy: Where countervailing interest
group power is exerted, government policy no longer simply tracks
377
the preferences of the wealthy. Rather, on issues where organized
groups advance the preferences of low- and middle-income Americans, government outcomes more often correspond to the prefer378
ences of low- and middle-income Americans. Consistent with these
findings, the state and local governments that have been most active
in attempting to redress wealth inequality of late are those operating
in regions with higher levels of organization among working peo379
ple.
Recent experience regarding presidential executive orders,
375
376
377
378
379

Lichtenstein, supra note 181, at 122–27.
See Sachs, supra note 26, at 167–68.
GILENS, supra note 191, at 121, 157–58.
Id. For example, Martin Gilens found that unions are among the most important forces
moving policy in a direction desired by the less well off. Id. at 158.
In 2014, the Seattle City Council voted unanimously to raise the minimum hour wage to
$15. SEATTLE, WA., Code ch. 14.19 (2014). In 2013, union members accounted for
18.9% of wage and salary workers in Washington State, almost six percentage points
above the national average of 11.3%. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union
Membership in Washington—2013 (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/regions/west/newsrelease/2014/pdf/unionmembership_washington_20140227.pdf. In California, where
the Los Angeles City Council is considering whether to raise the minimum wage to $15.25
an hour by 2019, 16.4% of workers were union members in 2013. Press Release, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Union Membership in California—2013 (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.bls.gov/regions/west/news-release/2014/pdf/unionmembership_
california_20140226.pdf; Emily Alpert Reyes, Nine things to know about boosting the minimum
wage in L.A., L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2015, 10:17 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/
lanow/la-me-ln-minimum-wage-20150324-story.html.
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such as the issuance of the labor executive orders following activity by
worker groups, further supports the conclusion that countervailing
380
organization can diffuse concentrated power.
2. Building Countervailing Organization
How then might legal and institutional reforms facilitate broader
and more equitable participation in organized political life? How
might countervailing organizations be brought into governance? A
full exploration of that question obviously cannot be tackled in the
remaining pages of this Article. In separate work, I will examine the
extent to which our civil society deficit is not simply a political problem, as is typically understood, but also a legal problem—a product of
legal structures that discourage or inadequately facilitate organization—with possible legal solutions. Here, I identify several strategies,
drawn from disparate fields in law and policy, worth further exploration.
First, administrative law and process could do more to provide a
formal role in governance for public interest organizations, particularly organizations that derive high proportions of funding from
membership contributions (from natural persons) and have members who enjoy rights to participate in associational decisionmaking.
Rather than simply lowering the barrier to enter the political or governing process and hoping that lower-income individuals or underresourced organizations take advantage, membership organizations
could be assigned more prominent roles of participation. This could
be done through any number of routes, such as soliciting their participation in congressional hearings, Federal Advisory Committees, and
in meetings with OIRA, the Domestic Policy Council, and other administrative offices. In addition to involving organizations in notice
and comment, agencies could also establish mechanisms to solicit input from membership associations regarding regulatory agendas and
proposed rules. Legislative offices could do the same. Consumer
empowerment programs advocated by such scholars as Ian Ayres and
John Braithwaite, or new governance models, such as those advocated
by Charles Sable and William Simon, offer a variation of this ap381
proach.
These programs have been successful, although not uni-

380
381

See supra Part III.A.
See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATED DEBATE 15–16 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992) (proposing regulatory
regimes more responsive to industry and consumer associations); Charles F. Sabel & Wil-
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formly so, at creating countervailing checks in the regulatory pro382
cess. They could potentially be more so if targeted at organizations
383
with a membership, rather than a management, character, and if
uncoupled from a strongly market-oriented approach to regulation.
Public interest organizations could also be involved in helping
agencies achieve compliance with the law. For example, Janice Fine
and Jennifer Gordon demonstrate how labor inspectorates that have
given organizations like unions and worker centers a formal, ongoing
384
role in enforcement in low-wage sectors have had greater success.
While Fine and Gordon’s aim is to achieve greater legal compliance,
involving civil society in enforcement efforts could also serve to
strengthen political competition and to diffuse power: It provides
agency officials the perspectives of a different segment of the population and counteracts capture by well-funded industry groups. Furthermore, involving membership associations more directly in setting
policy agendas, developing policy ideas, and achieving compliance
makes it more worthwhile for ordinary Americans to join the discus385
sion.
Second, to make such governance reforms work, organizations
representing low- and middle-income Americans must be much more
prevalent. To that end, the revitalization of worker organizations is
essential. As previously discussed, among the interest groups operating in the United States today, labor unions’ policy positions are most
386
closely associated with the preferences of the less well-off.
In the
United States, unions have successfully organized lower- and middleincome Americans for political action to greater extent than any other non-party actor. Though their track record has been checkered,
they constitute some of the few mass-membership organizations remaining. Meanwhile, there are indications that recent efforts by the
labor movement are more focused on political action and class-based

382

383
384
385
386

liam H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53,
56 (2011) (analyzing minimalist and experimentalist models of public intervention).
For an analysis of potential problems with empowerment of stakeholders as a means of
creating collaborative government and a discussion of the contexts in which collaborative
governance has been most successful, see Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits
on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 413 (2000).
See id. at 500 (emphasizing need for interest group internal democracy).
Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement through Partnership with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 559 (2010).
SKOCPOL, supra note 5, at 290.
Sachs, supra note 26, at 168–69 (quoting GILENS, supra note 191). For further discussion,
see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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legislation, and less focused on site-by-site organizing and bargain387
ing.
Building on those efforts, labor law should be reformed to encourage worker organizations and to facilitate their active participation in politics and governance. While scholars have offered a host of
labor law reform proposals, few have focused their attention specifi388
cally on the political capacity of worker organizations.
More
thought is needed on that subject, as well on how law can facilitate
organization among low- and middle-income Americans in contexts
other than the workplace, including in schools, public benefit offices,
churches and other religious institutions, and community based or389
ganizations.
Third, political parties could be redesigned to strengthen the role
of rank-and-file members and to shift the balance away from elites.
To that end, some scholars have suggested that we reform campaign
finance law to channel contributions back to the formal political parties and away from large-donor governed “shadow parties” like Super
390
PACs.
Others advocate amending political law to ease restrictions
391
on grassroots organizing and coordination. Reinvigorated political
parties might not lead to less partisanship, but they could enhance
government accountability. Indeed, as Walter Dean Burham has argued, strong, participatory parties with coherent ideologies help government minimize the influence of powerful, rent-seeking economic
392
interests.

387

388

389
390

391
392

Kate Andrias, Law and the Labor Question in the Post New Deal Order: Reasoning from the Fight
for $15 (Univ. of Cal. Santa Barbara, Beyond the New Deal Order Conference, Sept. 2426, 2015) (on file with author).
Benjamin Sachs’ “unbundled union” proposal is a notable exception. Sachs, supra note
26, at 153, 155 (arguing that opposition to collective bargaining impedes unions’ ability
to serve as a political-organizing vehicle for lower- and middle-income groups and advocating an “unbundled labor law” that would allow workers to form a “political union,”
which would be barred by statute from engaging in collective bargaining, but would be
able to serve as a vehicle for collective political voice for workers who decided to join).
For some tentative ideas on how law might facilitate organization among low-income
Americans, see Sachs, supra note 26.
See Fishkin & Gerken, supra note 175 at 179, 211–12 (analyzing McCutcheon’s impact on
campaign-finance, namely the facilitation of shadow parties and their resulting implications for party politics); Fishkin & Gerken, supra note 185, at 32–33 (describing the rise of
shadow parties and decline of the formal political parties).
See Bauer, supra note 363, at 81–82 (arguing for greater consideration of “doing politics”
instead of merely focusing on speech in the context of campign-finance jurisprudence).
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Fourth, we could unfetter the political activity of existing membership associations by reforming tax law. Under the current regime,
non-profit organizations are penalized for engaging in political activity and they receive little benefit from being representative in structure. Law reforms could alter existing incentives. For example, rules
designed to create firewalls in non-profits between partisan and nonpartisan activities could be repealed. Tax law could provide incentives for associations that derive high proportions of funding from
natural-person membership contributions and have members who
393
enjoy rights to participate in associational decision-making.
An obvious objection to these proposals is that if wealth is so powerful, no such changes could ever be enacted. The critique is true to
a point. Significant reform is unlikely in the current political environment. But as this Article has acknowledged, the power of wealth
ebbs depending on circumstance and alignments: When issues become particularly salient, the power of wealthy individuals and their
394
organizations can be overcome and their views can shift.
And, indeed, in recent months it appears that public concern about economic inequality is mounting, creating pressure on elected officials,
395
Democrat and Republican, to respond. The goal is to suggest that
if and when significant political and governance reform becomes possible, it should focus beyond efforts at insulation from, and moderation of, partisanship, and even beyond efforts to control campaign
money, to reforms that would shift long-term distribution of political
and economic power.
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social costs of a trend away from member-driven organizations and suggesting tax benefits
for membership organizations as one of several potential responses to mitigate these
costs).
For example, in November 2010, the House voted to ban the special-purpose spending
provisions known as earmarks from being inserted in legislation. Jennifer Steinhauer,
House Republicans Back No-Earmarks Rule, N.Y. TIMES THE CAUCUS (Nov. 18, 2010, 1:13
PM),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/house-republicans-back-noearmarks-rule/.
See Amy Chozick, Economic Plan Is a Quandary for Clinton ‘16, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, at
A1; Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Talk of Wealth Gap Prods the G.O.P. to Refocus, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2015, at A1 (detailing the shift in the traditional Republican narrative
around economic inequality in the 2016 presidential election campaign); Patrick
O’Connor, 2016 Populism on Left or Right Worries Chamber of Commerce, WALL ST. J.
WASHINGTON WIRE (Dec. 31, 2014, 10:07 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/12/
31/2016-populism-on-left-or-right-worries-chamber-of-commerce/ (exploring the Chamber of Commerce’s concerns about the 2016 presidential campaign’s emphasis on economic disparities).
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Whether any of the particular strategies identified above is worth
pursuing depends on their attendant costs to other democratic values
and on the relative merits of institutional and doctrinal alternatives.
Greater participation, for example, does not always lead to greater
organization. For present purposes, however, the goal is to highlight
the intimate relationship between constitutional structure and the
role of organization in American civic and political life. The rules
that structure American organizations should be seen as an essential
complement to the Article I and Article II provisions creating the
competing interests of the political branches—and they should be
seen as no less foundational to constitutional governance than the
political parties and the internal bureaucracy.
CONCLUSION
Leading constitutional law theorists and many public commentators worry intensely about the nefarious impact partisanship has had
on our system of constitutional governance, and particularly on the
expansion of the executive and the impotence of Congress. Americans, they argue, must, if nothing else, overcome political polarization. Those who study the internal workings of the executive branch
agree, though they are more optimistic; they promise that bureaucracy and internal checks offer a shield against partisanship, gridlock,
and the unbound executive. While both of these accounts have considerable purchase, their failure to consider how wealth systematically
shapes the branches, the parties, and the executive’s internal mechanisms leads to descriptive oversights. Whatever one’s normative take,
executive power, legislative gridlock, and internal executive branch
checks cannot be understood absent a political economy analysis.
But while the primary goal of this Article has been critical and descriptive, the claim is also normative: Even when partisan and internal executive branch checks are in place, power is concentrated in
too few hands—in ways detrimental to liberty, governmental efficacy,
and, particularly, democratic accountability. Ultimately, if such goals
remain aspirations of American government, reforms encouraging
the participation of not only individuals but also countervailing organizations are paramount. This Article has only suggested some potential reforms to that end. The project of thinking them through is
all the more urgent as inequality soars, membership in labor organizations declines, and the voices of middle- and lower-income Americans become fainter throughout the political and governing process.

